Red Lines on Iran (Updated)

ABC News is reporting that unnamed Pentagon officials are speculating on “red lines” that would prompt a preventive attack by the Israelis on the Iranians:

Senior Pentagon officials are concerned that Israel could carry out an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities before the end of the year, an action that would have enormous security and economic repercussions for the United States and the rest of the world.

A senior defense official told ABC News there is an “increasing likelihood” that Israel will carry out such an attack, a move that likely would prompt Iranian retaliation against, not just Israel, but against the United States as well.

The two “red lines” identified in the article are when Iran’s Natanz reactor produces enough HEU to make a nuclear weapon and when the Iranians take delivery of the SA-20 missile systems it’s purchased from the Russians. The SA-20 is an advanced surface-to-air missile system suitable for use against aircraft, cruise missiles, and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. It has a range of about 400 km. Deployment of these weapons would certainly make an Israeli attack chancier.

I continue to think that, despite all of the speculation, the idea of such attacks is pretty far-fetched. Still, the next administration whether an Obama Administration or a McCain Administration may have some early tests. If I were the Iranians I wouldn’t cross any lines until February.

Update

In From the Cold looks at the impact of prospective SA-20’s on Iranian air defense:

Obviously, Iran could use a long-rage, state-of-the-art SAM system to complement the SA-15, covering large areas that are now defended by older systems like the Chinese CSA-1, the Russian-built SA-5, or the U.S.-made I-HAWK, acquired in the early 1970s. Those SAMs pose a relatively minor threat to a potential Israeli strike package.

On the other hand, the presence of SA-20 batteries in Iran would clearly impact tactical planning by the Israeli Air Force. As we observed many months ago, the task of getting to Iran would limit the size of the IAF strike package; trying counter the SA-20 threat would force the Israelis to devote more assets to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). That means more anti-radiation missiles on the pylons and fewer bombs–further reducing the operational margin for error.

Still, Iran would be foolish to underestimate the IAF. The Israelis have other methods for hammering an air defense system (think SOF teams and information operations), tools that were reportedly used in the strike on that Syrian nuclear site last year. During that strike, the IAF flew across Syria and back again, apparently without being detected. They wouldn’t necessarily need the same level of surprise against Iran–just enough delay or confusion in the air defenses to get the strike package in, and bombs on target.

The balance of his observations are well worth reading.

4 comments… add one
  • Dave, the State Dept forcibly debunked the anonymous official today.

    But…there’s a rumor that Iran may have agreed to a six week suspension of enrichment activities.

    Regards, C

  • Andy Link

    Dave,

    Just a point-of-fact, but there isn’t a reactor at Natanz and reactors can’t make HEU.

    This from the article leads me to believe this “source” doesn’t really know what he/she is talking about:

    The first is tied to when Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility produces enough highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon. According to the latest U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments, that is likely to happen sometime in 2009, and could happen by the end of this year.

    Natanz could, if reconfigured somewhat, could begin to produce HEU right now. Of course that would be very difficult for Iran to do undetected. The 2009 figure for enough HEU probably assumes Iran feeds the Russian LEU reactor fuel meant for Bushehr into its cascades – going from LEU to HEU is much faster since most of the separative work goes into producing LEU. Iran could not do that without detection.

    So I don’t understand that “red line.” It doesn’t make much sense.

    The SA-20 is a very advanced system that would provide the Iranian’s a generational leap in air defense capability. Iran has sought to purchase such systems for a long time and has been unsuccessful. I think it’s quite unlikely that they would acquire SA-20’s at this time for a number of reasons.

  • Thanks, Andy. I knew that (it’s in a post just a little farther down) and I’m ashamed of myself for the slip.

  • Andy Link

    No need to be ashamed – just a little typo is all!

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