Badgers Forward notes the shortcomings of two of the prevailing “narratives” of the War on Terror:
In the World War II narrative, if September 11 is Pearl Harbor, Al Qeada is the Japanese and Hussein is Hitler; Ba’athist Iraq is Nazi Germany.
It is an appealing narrative. The comparisons of Hitler’s Germany and Hussein’s Iraq have much to recommend them. Of course, no matter how nuanced one’s analysis of World War II, most people will believe the Allies cause was righteous and the Axis cause was evil. Certainly not a universal notion, but the defenders of the Axis powers are a relative rarity.
This narrative is problematic too though. Not the least of which is the reliance on maneuver warfare to fight the war. The realties of combat are easy to rationalize. This narrative also relies on the ability to clearly show who is “winning” and who is “losing.”
The other popular narrative is Iraq as Vietnam. In this narrative September 11, WMD, and the other rationale are pre-textual, they supplant the real goal of profit for oil companies and the “military industrial complex, personal revenge of the President and a chance to play war leader. These provide a collective Gulf of Tonkin resolution where Turner Joy and Maddox were never attacked. The war or more accurately the post-1964 escalations are pretextual. and not merely the preservation of an anti-communist government in the Republic of Vietnam.
For those who subscribe to this narrative, the War in Iraq and the war in Vietnam, there are nefarious ends. Profits, personal power, revenge. This narrative also minimizes the threat communism posed and the threat radical Islam poses today.
What’s being referred to these days as “narratives”, models we use to understand reality are not to be despised. We don’t have the equipment to apprehend reality directly. The territory is not the map and maps are all we can really latch onto. But I’m enough of a logical positivist to think that some narratives are better than others.
I don’t have the time this morning to expand too much on this but the two narratives presented above are not the only ones available for thinking about whatever you want to call the struggle we’re in although they’re the narratives that are being proposed by the political antipodes here in the United States. Three immediately leap to mind, the first of which, the blood feud, I mentioned earlier today.
Two others that leap to mind are politics and the Cold War. I think that, rather unfortunately, much of our professional political class is looking at the struggle as the same sort of political process to which they’ve devoted their careers: if only we keep negotiating we can arrive at an agreement. The other, the Cold War, is how I think most of us are thinking of things—a dimly-understood, hazy conflict the will go on for a long, long time.
I think that, rather unfortunately, much of our professional political class is looking at the struggle as the same sort of political process to which they’ve devoted their careers: if only we keep negotiating we can arrive at an agreement.
Can give more detail on this, Dave? What kind of “negotiating” is “our professional political class” doing, and with who?
This post is mostly a hit-and-run, Chris, rather than a thoroughly thought-out exploration.
Read the comments of most of our national leaders about the Iraqi government, Chris. I take what they’ve got to say as assuming that their own experience in law and government is relevant to the Iraqi experience. That’s how I take the language that’s come pretty consistently from the White House about universal longing for freedom, etc. It’s not that I don’t think that they believe it. I think they do believe it. I think their attitude is parochial and that, while I agree that longing for freedom is a universal human aspiration, how that freedom is defined is culturally mediated.
That’s also how I take what’s coming from the Congressional leadership. It looks to me as though they’re interpreting the Iraqi government through the prism of American politicians rather than, for example, the attitudes of tribal leaders in Iraq. Again, I’m hip-shooting.
And negotiating? I think that all those lawyers in the Congress wish so fervently there were somebody to negotiate with that they’re assuming that it’s so. That colors attitudes not only towards the Middle East but China and North Korea as well.
Hey Dave,
Hope you had a great Fourth.
This is a very illuminating bit by you, If nothing else, it reveals some of the attitudes that are handicapping our winning this war.
I lean towards the WWII version, myself (you probably know that!). Important to remember that the Cold War never involved an attack on our soil..although the attempts to infiltrate us ideologically have some distinct similarities ( as do some of the remedies that we need to use).
The idea of Iraq and al-Qaeda personifying Nazi Germany and Japan is ludicrous, in my view. Saddam was aligned with our enemies, but not an imminent threat, , and al-Qaeda are just subcontractors of jihad..shock troops, if you will.
Important also to remember not to confuse the western `nation-state’ with the Islamist concept of the Muslim ummah and the religious imperative of jihad.
The key to victory involves confronting ( militarily or otherwise) the nation-states that that fund, support and harbor jihad against the West, which is EXACTLY what president Bush said he was going to do in the speech he made to the nation after 9/11. You clean out the rats at the nest.
Had Bush actually done that, and been willing to force his buddies in Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to make some hard choices, this war would already be over and he’d be getting ready to head back to Crawford regarded by his fellow citizens as one of our greatest presidents.
As we now know, he had somewhat different agenda.
That’s what it will take to win this war, and we will eventually have to do the job…whether we like it or not.
All Best,
FF
Dave, that’s a fair point. That said, I do think there is at least some validity to negotiating with the Iraqi government.
Insofar as many of the key issues in fixing Iraq involve their participation (getting the parliment back in session, hammering out an oil-sharing agreement, etc.) Essentially, we have two ways of getting our way on these issues – talking and fighting. And since the Iraqi government is the closest thing we’ve got to an ally in non-Kurdish Iraq, it’ll have to be talk. Like the man said, jaw, jaw, jaw is better than war, war, war.