I think that this Associate Press story provides a succinct summary of the important developments today in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah:
BEIRUT, Lebanon – Israeli warplanes Sunday hit a minibus carrying Lebanese fleeing border villages, killing three and wounding 13, Lebanese security forces said. Hezbollah guerillas fired rockets into northern Israel, killing at least two people.
Israeli troops continued to hold a Lebanese border village that they battled their way into on Saturday, but did not appear to be advancing, Lebanese security officials said. Warplanes and artillery were heavily battering areas across the south.
Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz told the Cabinet that the current offensive is not an invasion of Lebanon, but rather a series of limited raids into the area.
Peretz also said that Israel would accept a temporary international force, preferably headed by NATO, deployed along the Lebanese border to keep Hezbollah guerrillas away from Israel, according to officials in Peretz’s office.
Israel also hit the southern port of Sidon for the first time in its campaign, destroying a religious complex linked to Hezbollah and wounding four people. More than 35,000 people streaming north from the heart of the war zone had swamped the city, which is teetering under the weight of refugees.
Considering the last bit first as long as Hezbollah remains armed Israel will reasonably consider Hezbollah facilities to be legitimate targets. The problem is that there’s no way for Israel to limit the carnage in such situations to Hezbollah. UN humanitarian chief Jan Egeland has noticed the situation:
Israeli bombing of a Beirut neighbourhood where Hizbollah had its headquarters has breached humanitarian law, a senior U.N. official said on Sunday.
“It is horrific. I did not know it was block after block of houses,” Jan Egeland, the U.N. emergency relief coordinator, told reporters as he toured the shattered Haret Hreik district. “It makes it a violation of humanitarian law.”
“It’s bigger, it’s more extensive than I even could imagine,” he said, surveying a pile of rubble.
Someone please correct me if I’m wrong but under international law isn’t Hezbollah’s placing of its facilities in civilian areas the breach of international law here? I look forward to Egeland’s plan for disarming Hezbollah.
A key point:Â we don’t arm the Red Cross. Hezbollah’s self-definition as simultaneously a military organization and the primary relief agency is inherently problematic.
This story handily illustrates the notion I’ve been harping on: under the present circumstances there’s no way for Israel to pursue Hezbollah (at least from the air) without lots of non-Hezbollah casualties, that will cause Israel to lose ground (if such a thing be possible) in the court of world public opinion, and there is a point at which non-Hezbollah casualties undermines Israel’s justification for its conduct of the war.
Now to the first snippet. That story simply doesn’t tell us enough. Who was in the minibus? Was there an adjacent target? Was this an accident? Is Israel creating a kill zone in which its warplanes are going after everything that moves? We don’t have enough information to make an informed decision.
Finally, Mr. Peretz’s call for a NATO force presents echoes of my observations from yesterday: absent the United States who will comprise a force capable of taking on Hezbollah’s well-trained, equipped, and motivated fighters? How would a force consisting mostly of U. S. soldiers be preferable to Israel itself?
I suspect that Israel realizes that a NATO force absent a large American contingent would be skewed towards Hizb’allah, much like the UNFIL forces have become quite cozy with Hizb’allah in the last six years.
I am a bit confused by Israel’s actions so far, probably because I assumed that they would finally acknowledge that world opinion of them couldn’t get much worse, so what did they have to lose? But now I’m thinking that Israel has been surprised by Hizb’allah’s resistence, which carries its own concerns.
Dan, the reason I’ve been harping on the proportionality issue lately is that I’m trying to get people to get beyond sloganeering and cheering for the home side and reflect seriously on the gravity of going to war. I share your concerns about the effects of war constrained in such a way that it becomes perpetual.
I believe that the threshold for going to war has become far, far too low. That’s why, as I’ve said before, I have opposed every use of force by the United States in roughly 30 years, particularly the actions in Bosnia and Kosovo. I believe that we should only go to war when it actually is a last resort and the political will to engage in it has been mustered. Then we should prosecute it with whatever resources are required to achieve victory.
In this instance I think that Israel has erred and transformed a border incident into something that bids fair to be an existential struggle.
We agree here, Dave. I am migrating away from sites that are devolving into shoutfests. I can’t hide the fact that I lean towards Israel in this current fight, but I also don’t think that everything Israel does is ipso facto above reproach. I’m merely trying to think this through without screaming.
You raise an important issue. If the threshold for war has indeed become too low, haven’t the institutions we have set up been a colossal failure?
I’m certainly not as well versed in history as you are, so could you illustrate your premise? I mean, what evidence have you seen that war is easier to get into today, than, say, between 1337 and 1453?
Maybe I misunderstand. Are you talking about the US specifically here? Also, can’t an argument be made that reluctance to engage in shooting actually contributes to more deaths? Likewise, given your opinion re: Kosovo and Bosnia, isn’t this consistent with the US’ hands-off policy vis-a-vis Israel-Hizb’allah?
I hope I am not being snarky. I sincerely would like to read your ideas, here (mostly because I respect your ability to think things through and that you refrain from insult when doing so).
I certainly don’t take your comments as snarky. I’m mainly talking about the US because that’s where my interests lie and what much of my knowledge is of. War certainly seems easier for the United States than it did until 1941. While I support having a strong defense I found Reagan’s lack of reluctance to use America’s military power troubling. As I see it that’s a practice that has continued through each subsequent administration.
Consider, for example, Clinton’s fly-by attacks on Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. I’m not convinced these did more good for our interests than harm.
In the specific cases of Bosnia and Kosovo I thought the problems were many including sovereignty issues, lack of a coherent rationale, lack of vital interest, and the need for Europeans to step up to the plate and start handling European issues themselves. I’ve complained before about the infantilization of other countries including Europe, Mexico, China, and India in U. S. foreign policy.
I don’t know. I don’t think so. Again, restricting myself to the U. S. case, I think that uncertainty about U. S. responses and intentions on the part of potential opponents provides continual incentives to test the boundaries. In the case of the Middle East I find the bit-by-bit insinuation of U. S. force in the region over the period of the last 50 years as a good part of the reason for the fix that we’re in now.
My sense on that is that it was part of a longterm policy of Hamiltonian realism with respect to the region that simply hasn’t worked as expected.
In general I have little interest or knowledge about the internal politics of other countries. As far as I’m concerned it’s their business how they conduct their internal affairs. Israel is no exception to that.
I know very little about internal Israeli politics and, honestly, care less. Has uncertainty on the part of Israel’s enemies contributed to the problems they’ve got now?
I honestly don’t see that it’s possible for Israel to eliminate Hezbollah’s offensive capacity without the conflict expanding and spreading uncontrollably and I don’t see that as being in Israel’s survival interests. Or ours.
Agreed. I also think that the varying positions between and within administrations adds to anxiety among noth our allies and enemies. I take your point about U.S. involvement in the region, however, I’m not convinced that it could have been otherwise from the point that the Western powers decided to carve up the region.
The die has been set for decades, now, but I don’t discount the possibility that we are seeing the first stages of a redrawn Middle East. Iraq looks to be partitioning itself already. This will likely lead to a regional war, and for obvious reason might bring the greater powers in, at least by proxy.
Redrawn or drawn and quartered?
My notion on the “varying positions between and within administrations” is that there are at least two distinct positions. One position is simply too quick on the trigger. The other position steadfastly opposes the use of force when it’s in America’s interests to do so and supports it when America has little to gain and much to lose. I don’t question either the motives or patriotism of those who hold to either position. I question their judgment.
I am not sure that it’s become easier for us to go to war. We remember Grenada and the “fly by” attacks, but history by and large will not. If you go back to the period between World Wars, you will, I think, see that we had many, many small incursions, wars, “gunboat diplomacy” in a literal sense, and so on. Before that was our unfortunate semi-imperial period and the wars in the Philippines and other places around the Far East and the Caribbean/Central America. Then before that was the Civil War and Reconstruction, where we basically kept to ourselves because we had too much to deal with. Before that were a series of raids into Canada and Mexico, as well as full-bore wars with Mexico and England. I don’t think we’ve ever had a period of more than about 15 years where we were not at all committed abroad.
As to Israel’s position, I understand that you are in part using this to make a point about the US. However, Israel’s position is clear to me: they were attacked because the same kinds of attack in the past had worked for Hizb’allah and Hamas. Given that Israel was going to be attacked that way more frequently if they gave in, and that Israel was going to be attacked that way more frequently if they did nothing, how could Israel do anything but attack Hamas and then, when Hizb’allah imitated, Hizb’allah?
Jeff, my position is that first, Israel’s decision to go to war was an error. A fully justified error but an error nonetheless. An act of war doesn’t require a state to go to war even if it’s justified in doing so. The detailed analyses I’ve read (I’d link to one if I could put my hands on one right this second) suggest that Hezbollah took advantage of an Israeli officer’s error. The solution to that isn’t raiding southern Lebanese villages, bombing Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut (even though it’s a legitimate target—as I’ve mentioned before), blockading Lebanon, or disabling the main road to Syria: it’s make fewer errors.
BTW I’ve been struggling over putting together a balance sheet to try to help explain the differing systems of rewards and responses that contribute to the decisions of both Hezbollah and Israel to keep doing what they’ve been doing in the recent hostilities. Unless those change somehow I think this is going to continue for quite some time.