In for the long haul: what needs to happen in the War on Terror

Jeff Medcalf of Caerdroia made a comment to a Winds of Change post a week or so ago that I thought was absolutely brilliant. He drew a distinction between a “fast war” and a “slow war” and characterized the present approach to the War on Terror generally and the ongoing counter-insurgency in Iraq specifically as a slow war.

That’s clearly correct and it made me start thinking about the U. S. experience with war throughout its history. Take a look at the following table:

War Began Administration at start Ended Administration at end Resolution
Mexican-American War 1846 Polk 1848 Polk U. S. victory
American Civil War 1861 Lincoln 1865 Lincoln Union victory
Spanish-American War 1898 McKinley 1898 McKinley U. S. victory
World War I (American involvement) 1917 Wilson 1918 Wilson Allied victory
World War II (American involvement) 1941 Roosevelt 1945 Roosevelt (his vice-president, Truman, succeeded him when he died in 1945) Allied victory
Korean War 1950 Truman 1953 Eisenhower inconclusive; Korea remains partitioned today
Viet Nam War 1956 Eisenhower 1975 Nixon (succeeded by his vice-president, Ford, after he resigns in 1974) effective U. S. defeat
Cold War 1945 Roosevelt 1991 Bush 41 effective U. S. victory when the Soviet Union disbands in 1991

There are a few other protracted conflicts, like the Moro Wars in the Philippines at the turn of the last century, that I just don’t know enough about to comment on with any confidence.

Note that when administrations actually changed in the midst of a conflict in Korea and Viet Nam that the new administration was ultimately willing to abandon its predecessor’s policies and, “declare victory and go home” (or, in the case of Korea, draw a line and stay behind it). Now it’s possible and reasonable to consider both the Korean War and the Viet Nam War as battles within the Cold War but that just makes the Cold War that much more exceptional. How did we keep slogging on despite such major setbacks?

The War on Terror is both similar and dissimilar to the Cold War. Like the Cold War we did not choose it—it came to us. And, also like the Cold War, it is unlikely that it can be concluded with a master stroke. We are in it for the long haul. And, again like the Cold War, we must slog on because we have no choice.

There are substantial differences from the Cold War, too. It’s much more difficult to point out the enemy. And (unless you consider Korea and Viet Nam to be campaigns in the Cold War) we’re taking more casualties, particularly civilian casualties.

But, in my view, the most notable difference between the Cold War and the War on Terror is that for the first twenty or so years of the Cold War there was a bipartisan consensus that supported the war and its active prosecution. I don’t believe that such a bipartisan consensus exists now.

I won’t bother to produce proof or citations to demonstrate that there isn’t a bipartisan consensus on the War on Terror. It’s obvious to anyone with eyes to see or ears to hear with. The Bush Administration is committed to a forward strategy in which (potentially impossible, in my opinion) liberal democracy is the keystone of that strategy, imposed by force if necessary. The Democratic Party on the other hand is torn between a detestation of George W. Bush and a consequent opposition to anything he proposes, the belief (vain, in my opinion), that if you harden enough targets sufficiently that an acceptable level of security can be achieved, and a (futile, in my opinion) concentration on “the real perpetrators of September 11” and especially Osama Bin Laden.

That’s very different from the Cold War. My friend, Mark Safranski, could no doubt speak more authoritatively on the origins and nature of the bipartisan consensus that backed our policies during the Cold War at least for the first twenty years or so (it’s clear, at least to me, that the consensus progressively broke down after 1968). I think that one of the key differences is Eisenhower.

I’ve written about Eisenhower before. His status as a war hero, the relentlessly cheerful and non-partisan character of his 1952 presidential campaign, and his support for Truman’s Cold War policy IMO cemented the foundations of the consensus on our Cold War policies. Those were unique circumstances, he was a unique individual, and I just don’t see any Eisenhowers around now.

In 2008 the Bush Administration will come to an end. I take Dick Cheney at his word—he won’t run (and he probably wouldn’t be electable if he did). I seriously doubt that Condoleezza Rice will be the next President of the United States. So whether the next president is a Republican or a Democrat the next administration will not be a continuation of this one and the next president will not have the degree of commitment to the policies of this administration that a senior member of the administration would have.

The very last things that I am are either a military expert or an Iraq expert but the trends that I see don’t suggest that Iraq will have a stable, liberal democratic government capable of defending itself against enemies foreign and domestic by 2008. A substantial American presence will be needed there in 2008 and, probably, considerably beyond. So, if there is any possibility of the Bush Administration’s forward strategy succeeding some domestic foundations must be laid and laid very soon.

The most urgent thing the Bush Administration needs to do is to explain its policy to the American people completely and clearly. I’ve read better explications in the blogosphere of the strategy than anything I’ve heard or read from the administration. This needs to be done immediately and repeatedly.

The second thing that needs to happen is that the American people need to be enlisted in the War on Terror. All of the factors currently in place distance the American people from the war: the relative silence of the Administration, the press’s stance on the war, the recommendations to “just go shopping”, the all-volunteer military, and the low number of American casualties. And, while that may function as short-term political insurance, it doesn’t ensure long-term support for the efforts that need to be made. Call for sacrifice. Massively increase recruitment drives. Raise taxes. Start a bond drive. Get the American people involved.

Seek out and cultivate whatever small number of Democratic politicians actually favor the Administration’s policies on the War on Terror. The Administration may wish, hope, and expect that Republicans will control the White House and both houses of Congress forever. That’s not going to happen. Democrats need to support the War on Terror, too. It’s possible that necessity will force a Democratic president to support the present policies on the War on Terror whatever the stated (or unstated) position of the party might be. That shouldn’t be assumed.

Persuasion and consensus-building have not been the long suits of the Bush Administration. They’d best learn and learn quickly. Or be prepared to win the War on Terror decisively by 2008.

3 comments… add one
  • Superb post.

    “Vital Consensus” was coined by the liberal Arthur Schlesinger who helped found Americans for Democratic Action, not to combat Republicans or conservatives but Communist influence on the American Left.

    Things, as you point out, have changed considerably and the Bush administration is poorly suited to reaching out to even reasonable critics – even in the interest of isolating the unreasonable ones, who are numerous.

  • Barnabus Link

    Oh, there was consensus on Iraq when Clinton was president. Given the Democrats ability to completely say the opposite of what they said not that long ago…no doubt they can switch back again once they gain power.

    As for 2008…we will be dealing with islamic terrorism for at least 50 years.

  • Fine post; agree on the need for better PR.

    But the “Master Strokes” are known.
    Free & Fair elections in: Egypt, Arab Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran. (And Sudan? First?)

    All after Iraq gets a new constitution, and elections. 10-20 years, not 50.

    20-30 000 troops will be enough to make sure the USA supported Iraqi gov’t can win any battle — only the Iraqis can stop the Death Squad assassination war that already seems to be starting.

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