In his latest Wall Street Journal column Walter Russell Mead has some interesting definitions of winning and losing directed at the G-7 representatives who seem to confuse pontificating with achievement:
Winning means getting Russia to withdraw from Syria, the Donbas and Crimea. A diplomatic victory is when China agrees to dismantle military bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea. Success involves getting Iran to stop arming and funding armed militias and terrorist groups in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq.
Losing, on the other hand, is something the West has become quite good at. Losing is watching construction continue on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as Russia declares the country’s largest opposition party an illegal conspiracy. Losing is moaning about Chinese behavior in the South China Sea as the military balance tilts toward Beijing. Losing is crafting intricate webs of ineffectual sanctions as Russia’s reach and control inexorably expand. Losing is wringing one’s hands and issuing eloquent critiques as China intensifies its crackdowns in Tibet, Hong Kong and Xinjiang.
Perhaps it’s just me but I see something of a mismatch in those success criteria. A year-round port has been part of Russia’s definition of winning for more than 200 years. IMO the notion that Russia will cede that goal to an anti-Russian regime of dubious legitimacy in Ukraine is pretty far-fetched.
I can’t speak authoritatively to China’s objectives in trying to consolidate its control of the South China Sea or Iran’s support for Islamist terrorist groups. Perhaps someone can explain it to me. I could speculate that in China’s case it’s about natural resources and trying to obstruct U. S. “freedom of navigation” exercises and in Iran’s that it’s part of Iran’s asserting its role in the Islamic world but those would just be speculations.
As far as the losing side of the equation goes, I think I can explain that in one word: Germany. As long as Germany sees its relationships with Russia, China, and Iran as economically advantageous, the G-7 will keep losing as Dr. Mead defines it.
Walter Russell Meade, as usual, represents one extreme of the foreign policy spectrum. He is very predictable, and very tiresome. He is one of the reasons I am letting my subscription to the WSJ lapse. Their collection of loony tunes commentators is just too big, almost as big as the NYT’s, which I let lapse years ago.
I agree Germany is one reason Meade’s wishes are left unsatisfied. But they are not alone. Of the 14 countries that signed the RCEP free trade agreement with China, five are our allies: Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Supposedly they are with us and against China. Supposedly. For each of the 14, China is their largest trading partner. The US and India are excluded from RCEP by their own choice.
An even in Europe, Germany is not alone. The EU initialed, but hasn’t yet ratified, the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. China is a major trading partner of almost every EU country.
Russia on the other hand is near to being an economic autarchy, with no levers or strings attached. They can and do ignore our tantrums with near impunity.
Meade’s frustration comes from his fundamental misconception of the power of the US. It is not 1945, or even 1992. We are not the world’s only superpower. We are tied. The Russian-Chinese alliance vs. the US-EU alliance: total GDP (PPP), $31T vs $44T; manufacturing, about equal, but R-C much more diverse; active duty military, 3.3 M vs 3.1 M. There is simply no way for the US-EU to impose its will on Russia-China. There is no leverage in any area.
I will agree to the extent that my objective would not be U. S. hegemony but more of a 19th century spheres of influence arrangement. I don’t think the countries of continental Europe are our allies in any but a nominal sense. At this point “continental Europe” is mostly another word for Germany.
A more interesting question is what should our relationship with japan be? I don’t have an answer but think it’s an interesting question.