I’ve just finished listening to President Obama say that he had decided to use military force against Syria and that he would seek Congressional approval for the action. I think that seeking Congressional approval is prudent and only time will tell whether attacking Syria is also prudent.
In the comment thread to a skeptical post at OTB by James Joyner on the strategic value of attacking Syria frequent commenter Michael Reynolds predicts:
We’ll blow some things up. Assad will not use chemicals again. Then they will resume their regularly-scheduled civil war. We will lose zero Americans. There will be zero boots on the ground (excepting intel.)
And here’s my “out on a limb†prediction: Russia, seeing the potential for this to cause problems for them, will pressure Assad into negotiating. Those negotiations will begin to consider partitioning Syria into (roughly) Shia and Sunni areas.
That’s actually seven predictions and for me they are roughly in descending degree of confidence. I want to focus on the last two predictions.
The Assad regime and the Russians have repeatedly said that Assad’s remaining in power was a precondition for negotiations while the rebels have made Assad’s departure a precondition for negotiations. Under the circumstances I see the most likely scenarios as:
- They’re both kidding and will settle the Syrian civil war at the negotiating table.
- Assad is kidding. He’ll leave and the Syrian civil war will be settled at the negotiating table.
- The rebels are kidding and the Syrian civil war will be settled at the negotiating table.
- Neither side is kidding. Negotiations are impossible.
- There is no unified opposition with which to negotiate. Whatever the Assad regime may want or do negotiations in good faith are impossible.
The only scenarios that I see as remotely possible are #4 and #5.
I suspect that the Russians would negotiate. Their original concerns were military and economic, but along the way, humiliating the US has been added. Also, they are probably concerned about outsiders meddling with the internal affairs of a country – Responsibility to Protect.
I do not think they will abandon Assad, but something could be worked out. He could step down “for the good of the country.”
Address these concerns, and a solution can be negotiated.
The rebels cannot win without close combat air support, and presently, they will be slowly ground down over the next few years.
It’s not just Assad. It’s the whole regime. And they have nowhere to go.
The treatment of Mubarak really poisoned the well on that.
I agree that 4 and 5 are most likely. The rebels are not a cohesive group. I think the Russians would desert Assad in a heartbeat since he has handled conditions in Syria poorly, but only if they can maintain their interests.
Steve
As I understand it, Russian interests are their naval base, Orthodox Christians in Syria, prestige and arms sales. Partitioning Syria would maintain the base, provide a sanctuary for the Syrian Orthodox population, leave arms sales unhurt and, if they midwifed the settlement, probably increase Putin’s prestige.
I don’t think it’s at all outside the realm of possibility. But there is a reason I modified it as, “my out on a limb prediction. In other words, I wouldn’t bet my cigar allowance.
Heh. Looks like Obama heard the impeachment threats of his VP. et tu, Brute?
But hey, get Congress in, then vote present, then blame Congress if it goes bad………….or ride a chariot to a media rose petal shower if it goes well.
Sparkling leadership.
#4. This is an existential fight on both sides.
Andy, the reason I put #5 on the list was that I suspect that somebody somewhere could find a representative of some group or other that could be presented as “the rebels” and seated at a conference table. There would be no possibility of an actual, enforceable agreement (i.e. bargaining in bad faith) but it would give the appearance of a negotiation.
The Alawaite homeland is the seacoast. All of it as this map of the region illustrates. Partition would leave the Sunni interior landlocked and dependent on the Alawite portion. I don’t think that’s a stable configuration.
The same map illustrates the complexity of the religious/ethnic picture in some areas of Syria. All of Syria’s cities have large Christian populations. The Sunni interior is large but sparsely populated, mostly impoverished Bedouins.
I also believe that partition would foster new sectarian/ethnic conflicts. So, for example, the Kurds in the north have been fomenting for a “homeland” for generations and the new and weakened “Syria” would be a prime target.
Dave,
I don’t disagree with #5 in theory except that I don’t think Assad is going to negotiate whether there is someone on the other side or not.
Andy,
The Russians and Iran, despite public support, cant be happy with the guy. If he is given safe passage with lots of dough somewhere, along with family, and Russian interests can be maintained, I can see an attempt at negotiations of some sort.
Steve
Why would the Sunni interior be dependent on the coast for food, fuel, etc? Are Turkey and Jordan closing their borders? Iraq maybe, but Turkey and Jordan are both Sunni, and the north (Turkish border) is where the rebels are strongest.
Also, though Syria is not a big oil producer by the standards of Saudi Arabia, what oil there is would fall to the rebels. The easiest shipment route out to the sea would presumably be through Assad’s mini-state which would argue that they’d have a basis for making a mutually beneficial arrangement.
As for schism, I’d rather be playing the rebel hand in some ways. They have extremist Sunnis and less extreme Sunnis with a smattering of smaller ethnic groups. Assad’s rump state would be the more diverse.
Syria both imports and exports oil. It exports crude oil and imports refined oil products. About a third of Syria’s fuel is imported. Oil is a major source of foreign exchange for Syria, something that’s been impaired by trade sanctions.
Additionally, Syria imports a large proportion of its food. There are alternatives to using its ports but they will raise the cost of imports notably and, given the poverty of the Sunni areas, that’s not insignificant.
Steve,
Assad really isn’t the problem though. You could replace Assad but the rebels would not accept the same power structure with a different figurehead.
Additionally, to Michael’s point, schism may be a distant possibility, but as of now both sides (excepting the Kurds, possibly), are fighting for the whole chicken coop. A workable break-up of the country would be quite bloody as well.