There’s quite a bit of fulmination over the Obama Administration’s negotations with Iran, the Congress’s threats to tighten sanctions, and so on and I thought I’d repeat my own view. From one perspective it might be considered an Alfred E. Newman strategy.
Either Iran can be trusted to honor its commitments or it can’t. If it can, Iran has already promised not to develop nuclear weapons and we don’t need to negotiate anything with them. If they can’t and they do test a nuclear weapon, I think we should take it very, very seriously. Can an Iran that can’t be trusted be trusted to manage their nuclear weapons responsibly? At that point we would also have proof positive that negotiations with Iran is meaningless.
So, what, me worry?
Something missing from the third sentence if the second paragraph. I’ve noticed several such errors recently, and not just here. I think the autocompletion & autocorrect features on various devices are starting to cause more problems than they solve.
And has anyone else noticed autocompletion suggestiong words & even phrases before a word has even been started? Such features are making me wonder exactly how many actual humans could pass a Turing test from the MACHINE perspective.
Yes, thank you. Several words were missing.
As for the topic at hand, two observations.
First, I assume Iran cannot be trusted to honor international agreements, because I assume no nation can be so trusted to honor such agreements unless they believe it will benefit them. The real questions are how will Iran behave with a fully realized nuclear weapons program.
Second, I find the criticism coming from the Senator from NJ, Menendez, sounding more strident in his opposition to Obama’s than McCain, if possible, very interesting. It suggests that at least some Senate Dems feel that Obama is both wrong and no longer a potential threat/helper despite the alleged recent surge in o’s poll numbers.
The whole thing is farcical and will be until they start talking about dismantling Israel’s undeclared nukes.
Iran will have nukes. This is just everybody coming to terms with it. As soon as they get them, everybody can move on to the next crisis. Iran with nuclear weapons will be no worse than Pakistan with nuclear weapons, and the people who are worried about Iran are perfectly fine with Pakistan.
At this point, Iran has little need for nuclear weapons. Through meddling in Iraq, the US destroyed their natural enemy. Through meddling in Libya and then Syria, the US facilitated the Saudi’s sworn enemy to gain a foothold on their border, and the Saudis are another enemy. Through mismanagement in Afghanistan, it will return to its previous state. (You deal with the secular bad guys – warlords, drug dealers, etc.)
There are two choices in the ME – ISIS or Iran.
ISIS is a natural fit for conservatives. They are go-getters. They do not sit around waiting for government handouts. They pull themselves by their bootstraps. These guys not only exploit opportunities, but they also create opportunities. They are probably Mitt Romney Republicans.
I’m skeptical of that. I think that Iran is messianic and apocalyptic in a way that Pakistan isn’t. Pakistan wanted nukes to deter India. Ifr they are actually developing nuclear weapons, I think that Iran wants them so they can extend their influence without hindrance.
… I think that Iran is messianic and apocalyptic in a way that Pakistan isn’t. …
If Iran wanted to start the Apocalypse, they could have started it long ago, and they would not need nuclear weapons. They could have been using Hezbollah to stockpile suicide bombs in S. Lebanon for years, and they would have told Hamas to knock it off. They would want Hamas to play nice until everything was in place.
… Pakistan wanted nukes to deter India. …
That was a different Pakistan. You could make the same argument about an earlier Iran, but they do not have the internal radicals and instability that Pakistan does.
… Ifr they are actually developing nuclear weapons, I think that Iran wants them so they can extend their influence without hindrance.
According to the experts, they are 6 to 10 months away from having nuclear weapons, and they have been for the last 5 to 10 years. (It must be some space-time distortion thing specific to Iran, and the Israelis jets are going to defy the laws of physics.)
The Iranian’s want to be a regional influence, and that has little to do with the US. I would suggest that the region needs a single point of contact, and if it is Iran, so be it. I would further suggest that the Israelis would do better dealing with a strong opponent than a weak one.
There are advantages facing off against a bigger opponent, especially in a world that values strength, but most of those advantages disappear when you are evenly matched.
I would donate some of the smaller nukes President Obama wants to eliminate, but I would not include the delivery systems.
What you’ve outlined is why I don’t have my knickers in a twist about Iran’s nuclear weapons development program (if any).
Historically, the U. S. strategy in the region was something called the “Twin Pillars” strategy, leaning on and balancing KSA and Iran. That was thrown into a cocked hat by the Iranian Revolution. We’ve never recovered our footing.
I’ll continue to disagree with you on this one Dave. IMO it’s not about trust or waiting to see if Iran presents a fait accompli (or doesn’t). Any agreement requires verification measures so we know if a country is honoring its commitments. And once an agreement is made, whether and how a country honors there verification portion is a sign of how serious it is in honoring the agreement itself. This is how it worked (and continues to work) with the Russians. It’s not much advertised, but Russians come over here to inspect our stuff and we go over there to inspect their stuff. Both sides expect commitments to be verified.
Also, the like agreements with the Russians, the goal non-proliferation goal cannot directly prevent Iran, or any country, from building nuclear weapons – the actual goal is to provide warning should they attempt to break their agreement and raise the cost of attempting to covertly renege. Therefore, an agreement with Iran gives us, and the rest of the world, a mechanism to monitor their program to prevent a fait accompli, provide warning should Iran try to build a bomb, and deter Iran from trying. I don’t really see what the downside is for us on that, especially compared to the alternatives.
The sticking point is really political and related to Iran’s weapons-related activities prior to 2003. Specifically, should Iran be forced to “come clean” about everything it did in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Personally, I think Iran is hiding weapons research, but think pursuing a strategy to force Iran to admit that is a dead end and not worth the effort (and it’s probably counterproductive as well). The future of Iran’s nuclear program is more important than past activities and a verification agreement will do a lot more to prevent the rebirth of an Iranian weapons program than any of the alternatives.
Finally, Ken brings up Israel, but Iran’s nuclear weapons program had nothing to do with Israel despite the common wisdom. Iran’s program started in the 1980’s after the Iran/Iraq war began and ended in 2003 after Saddam was overthrown. Iran wanted nukes because Iraq was an existential threat and Iran knew Iraq was working on nukes too. Israel has never been an existential threat to Iran – in fact Iran and Israel were allies against Iraq during much of the 1980’s. The “it’s all about Israel” crowd don’t have an explanation for that.
Even today there’s no strategic reason for Iran to have nukes to counter Israel. Nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence against grave threats – What, exactly, would Iranian nukes deter Israel from doing? There isn’t a coherent answer to that.
That’s the crux. Also, note that (at least to the best of my knowledge) Israel has never threatened Iran while Iran has made threatening Israel a staple of its political discourse.
My position is, as it has been for a decade, that if Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons they’re trying to convince people (including its own people) that they are. There are reasons for this including status, regime insurance, and, as I suggested above, gaining a freer hand in expanding their influence.
Israel has threatened Iran by floating rumors via Jeffrey Goldberg it would attack their nuclear facilities (so as to provoke the U.S. into doing it for them) and by repeatedly demanding U.S. military action rather than negotiations.
In this one area I’m glad Obama is President as he is unwilling to do Netanyahu’s bidding.
Andy:
The IAEA has found several times that Iran has not merely repeatedly but systematically lied and cheated. We have very good reason to believe that Iran won’t conform to the terms of any agreement. I can see what the Iranians have to gain from negotiations whether it’s merely running out the clock or getting sanctions relaxed or even lifted. I can’t see what we get from negotiations that either a) are redundant or b) we can be assured that Iran won’t conform to whatever terms they agree to.
Yes, Iran lied and cheated about its nuclear program, but as I said, the actual violations took place prior to 2003 in the context of an existential competition with Iraq under the basic non-proliferation regime (which pretty much everyone agrees is inadequate to detect cheating.)
I don’t see major downside to negotiations to put in place a strong verification regime where it’s very likely that any cheating would be detected. Iran will, of course, demand a price to accept such a verification regime but if they refuse to accept it then we know their intentions.
What’s the alternative?
It wasn’t just in 2003 and prior, Andy. The IAEA repeated their rebuke in 2004, in 2006, and 2009 on activities that continued after 2003.
The alternative is to wait and see. If Iran doesn’t test a nuclear weapon (as they’ve claimed), well and good. If they do, since the regime has demonstrated it can neither be deterred nor negotiated with, treat it as though they’d used it or threatened to use it.
The IAEA detected no additional “cheating” after 2003. Without digging too much into the inside baseball, the IAEA rebukes, to use your term, were about two things – the resolution of a few outstanding issues from Iran’s previous cheating – mainly this is what the IAEA terms unresolved “possible military dimensions” to some of Iran’s activities. Secondly are political and technical disputes between Iran and the IAEA. Some post-2003 nuclear weapon-related activities have been alleged by some governments (including the US), but the IAEA has not been able to confirm or deny if those allegations are true. That’s why a better verification agreement with Iran is important because it will allow the IAEA (and, by extension, the rest of the world) to know what is going on with Iran’s program and monitor it. If Iran refuses to make an agreement, well then we know their intentions.
So, if the goal is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, I fail to understand how a “wait and see” approach will work. It’s much better, IMO, to try to get an agreement where we won’t have to wait and see.
I don’t think it will. I also don’t think that negotiating will effect that. I think that the Iranians will do whatever it is they intend to do regardless of negotiations or agreements.
That contradicts this: