What’s the Mission?

I was very confused by David Ignatius’s latest Washington Post column. In it he argues for U. S. forces to remain in Afghanistan for an indefinite period, presumably to prevent a chaotic withdrawal and engage in counter-terrorism operations:

ISLAMABAD — As President Biden nears a decision about withdrawing the 2,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, he doesn’t have a “best” option — only the one that’s least bad for the United States and its allies. That’s probably keeping the troops in place a while longer to avoid a chaotic departure.

quoting Gen. Dunford approvingly:

But other senior officials in Washington have told me that military leaders agree with a recommendation this month from retired Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said the United States should maintain its 2,500 troops, alongside about 5,000 NATO allies, and hunker down for a long support mission.

and mentioning these as alternatives:

Biden’s military and intelligence advisers have presented him with three unpleasant alternatives: leave May 1 as previously agreed, even though this would probably mean the fall of the Kabul government and a return to civil war; stay for a limited period, perhaps negotiated with the Taliban, which would delay its eventual takeover; or stay for an undefined period, which could mean a long continuation of what’s already the United States’ longest war.

adding another which he clearly views as impractical—being prepared for counter-terrorism operations from outside Afghanistan:

Maintaining a counterterrorism presence outside Afghanistan may sound like an attractive option. But experts caution that it may not be feasible militarily. A robust counterterrorism force would require drones over Afghanistan, but neighboring countries probably wouldn’t provide bases, meaning the drones might have to fly from the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia, hours away.

I found it confusing because I found it a jumble of different things. The present mission of U. S. forces in Afghanistan is neither counter-insurgency nor counter-terrorism. Dubbed “Resolute Support Mission”, it is to provide training and support for the forces of the Afghan government:

Resolute Support is a NATO-led, non-combat mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). It was launched on 1 January 2015, following the conclusion of the previous NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, and the assumption of full security responsibility by the ANDSF. The Resolute Support Mission works closely with different elements of the Afghan Army, Police and Air Force.

Unless that mission changes it will remain a support mission. There is little evidence that the Afghan military is capable of either successful counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism on its own or will become capable of doing either in the foreseeable future. Afghanistan doesn’t actually have the means to support a modern military, the only kind we’re capable of training.

Additionally, I learned long ago that there is nothing so permanent as a temporary structure. I grew up not far from a university at which quonset huts, erected during World War II, were still in use as classrooms 50 years later. Without empirical, measurable, achievable goals any temporary force will remain in Afghanistan forever.

From the very beginning I have maintained that, although counter-terrorism would have been a legitimate objective, counter-insurgency was not and simply unachievable in Afghanistan to boot. The closest thing Afghanistan has ever had to a national government was the monarchy. I can’t see the monarchy returning or the Taliban giving up. Nothing has changed.

So, Mr. Ignatius seems to be supporting an infinite unachievable mission to avoid a chaotic withdrawal. He is apparently unfamiliar with the concept of sunk costs.