What Can We Infer?

What can we infer from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech? I think there are at least two things.

First, the Ukrainian counter-offense damaged the Russians. At least politically and strategically and possibly tactically. And second the Russians are serious—they are unlikely to back down easily

How will the U. S. respond? I’m concerned that most pundits will call for a redoubling of aid to Ukraine and oppose negotiations at this point on the grounds that it would be rewarding Putin and/or Russia.

That might be characterized as “calling Putin’s bluff” except I don’t believe that he is bluffing.

8 comments… add one
  • CuriousOnlooker Link

    As for what is likely the Western response.

    https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11234251/America-hit-Russias-military-devastating-strike-Putin-nukes-Ukraine-says-general.html

    We have the former head of European command threaten to wipe out Crimea if Putin uses WMD in Ukraine — effectively putting Ukraine under the US nuclear umbrella.

    I don’t know; has Mr Hodges considered the Russians may not start with a nuclear strike in Ukraine….

    I said my part about the speech. The question is why anyone would think the Russians aren’t serious. On the subject of how Russians feel about the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine; experts have said the Russian considered it a red line for 30 years and Putin is acting as if it’s a redline.

  • Drew Link

    “I’m concerned that most pundits will call for a redoubling of aid to Ukraine and oppose negotiations at this point on the grounds that it would be rewarding Putin and/or Russia.”

    Well, Biden’s speech is nothing if not a full throated plea for doubling down.

  • Andy Link

    Partial mobilization was inevitable but may come too late. Most of Russia’s experienced forces, need to train and fill leadership positions in new units, were killed or wounded. But additional manpower may stop the hemmoraging.

  • CuriousOnlooker Link

    Andy,

    My concern is what if partial mobilization doesn’t work for Russia. Some other nuggets in the speech; the Russians don’t think the Ukrainians would have the capability to fight if not for copious support from the US/UK/EU. Putin’s indicated clearly he believes this is existential for Russia.

    What’s the next escalation after partial mobilization?

  • Andy Link

    Curious,

    The Russians are correct that US & NATO support has been essential for Ukraine’s defense and has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Russian soldiers.

    And yes, Russians do believe it is existential.

    So I don’t see how this ends, much less ends well.

  • steve Link

    But one party is delusional. It is not existential for Russia. Maybe for Ukraine. Given their willingness to fight and die rather than be conquered by Russia that seems pretty clear.

    Out of curiosity, who are the Americans who are opposing negotiations? That is Ukraine’s decision.

    Steve

  • steve Link
  • Andy Link

    “But one party is delusional. It is not existential for Russia. Maybe for Ukraine. Given their willingness to fight and die rather than be conquered by Russia that seems pretty clear.”

    Your assessment of what is or isn’t existential for Russia is not the same as Russia’s and is also irrelevant. The only thing that matters is how Russia (or any other country) views its strategic position.

    I agree to the extent that this war will be a net negative for Russia in about every way possible. But the same thing could be said about Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It took us quite a long time to finally conclude that the costs were not worth it.

    With this war it is still early days. The hubris has not yet been worn away by geopolitical reality. That’s one reason I’ve been saying for a while now that the war goals for both sides are completely unrealistic given current conditions. Sure, things might change, and both sides are hoping they will change. They won’t reduce their maximalist goals until they have no other choice. That’s the way countries consistently approach war.

    But there’s also a chauvinism that assumed (and continues to assume) that we know what’s really in the best interests of other countries, and that has not served us well. We don’t need to agree or accept their reasoning and calculus, but we should at least understand it. Whether one thinks Russian fears about NATO encroachment and Ukraine joining a hostile alliance were warranted or not, they were (and remain) very real to Russia. And this is before considering the historical complexity of where borders should be in countries that appeared as rumps from a centuries-old empire.

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