Understanding China’s Objectives

Ian Buruma’s New Yorker article, “Are China and the United States Headed For War” strikes me as a good survey of the spectrum of opinion about U. S.-China relations and I certainly found it interesting. Here’s a snippet:

For all that, China’s challenge to the established postwar order needs to be taken seriously. Gideon Rachman, the Financial Times foreign-affairs commentator, considers China’s increasing clout in the broader context of what he calls, in a remarkably ugly phrase, “Easternization,” which is also the title of his well-written new survey (just published by Other Press). The gravity of economic and military power, he argues, is moving from West to East. He is thinking of more than the new class of Chinese billionaires; he includes India, a country that might one day surpass even China as an economic powerhouse, and reminds us that Japan has been one of the world’s largest economies for some time now. Tiny South Korea ranks fourteenth in the world in purchasing-power parity. And the Asian megacities are looking glitzier by the day. Anyone who flies into J.F.K. from any of the metropolitan areas in China, let alone from Singapore or Tokyo, can readily see what Rachman has in mind. There is a great deal going on in Asia. The question is what this will mean, and whether “Easternization” is an illuminating concept for understanding it.

I found the strongest part of his analysis was his remarks on political developments within China which can be summarized:

• Communism has been replaced by partyism, rule by the CCP.
• The CCP has used nationalism as a means of bolstering its rule.
• Nationalism prods the Chinese to extend their clout, reclaiming what they see as China’s rightful place in world affairs (hegemony) and redressing old wrongs and slights.

The weakest part is this:

Etzioni admits that China has flouted international laws by claiming rights over islands far from its coastlines. It clearly wants to expand its influence from the Siberian borders all the way down to the sea-lanes running along Vietnam and the Philippines. But so far China has used almost no force to achieve its ends. Etzioni is convinced that Chinese policies are more concerned with rhetorical and symbolic assertions than with the outright projection of force. This means that, in his view, there is room for tension-easing compromise. Resources in the South China Sea could perhaps be shared. Certain concessions might be made; this or that island could be developed by China in exchange for territories elsewhere.

if, as it appears to me, Mr. Buruma approves of that reasoning. I think what’s going on in the South China Sea is quite different from what’s being described by the paraphrase of Mr. Etzioni. China’s leaders are treading a narrow line. They are aware of their own weakness and China’s but to maintain the present emphasis on nationalism they must challenge the “barbarians”. They have “used almost no force” because they understand what the outcome would be. However, there’s a clear implication of force in their actions, playing their weak hand well, intended to prompt precisely the sort of unearned concessions being suggested.

Additionally, Taiwan is not the red line. American grand strategy requires freedom of navigation and the Chinese are challenging that. China’s “Nine-Dash Line” that they’re using to justify their aggression is the red line and the Chinese have already crossed it. So far we’ve responded well. Offering concessions would be an error. That would be interpreted as a call to demand further concessions.

The real threat is the view, clearly widespread in China, that trade and diplomacy are zero sum games. From that point of view for China to achieve its objectives the U. S. must decline not merely in relative but in absolute terms. So far the Chinese have played their hand well.