As the chorus of retrospectives on the presidency of Barack Obama rises, the killing of Osama Bin Laden is inevitably mentioned. That in turn brings up an interesting question. What were the strategic implications of killing Osama Bin Laden?
That’s the subject of this post from the Rand research organization from earlier this year:
Research draws varying conclusions. Some analyses show that terrorist organizations may be able to replace their losses, as al Qaeda did with Ayman al-Zawahiri, also a long-time jihadist. But leadership is a precious commodity, which high-value targeting degrades — although in some cases the replacements for terrorist leaders killed proved to be more effective than their predecessors.
As a strategic tool, high-value targeting does not simply eliminate terrorist leaders but sends them deeper underground, impedes their ability to communicate, and degrades their ability to function. Obviously, it adversely affects morale. While al Qaeda’s terrorist capacity has declined, the loss of bin Laden was just one factor. Many of its most effective operational planners and commanders also have been eliminated; either captured or killed before or since bin Laden’s death.
Still, the demise of bin Laden cost al Qaeda its most charismatic and effective communicator. His successor, al-Zawahiri, certainly has the experience and ability to lead al Qaeda, but he lacks bin Laden’s moral authority and motivational skills. Since bin Laden’s death, Zawahiri may have come to fear that communications can be risky business for terrorist leaders. Over the last five years, Zawahiri has issued fewer than half the number of audio and video messages that he issued in the five years before the raid on Abbottabad.
Read the whole thing. It’s interesting.
The bottom line seems to be that the strategic implications of killing Osama Bin Laden have been ambiguous and it certainly wasn’t decisive. Which is essentially what I said five years ago.
No single event is ever decisive in modern wars. We are all out of Cannaes. Reducing the enemy’s effectiveness is a good outcome. It’s not enough – and I don’t think anyone thought killing Bin Laden would be enough – but it’s a hell of a good start. Had Colonel Von Stauffenberg had a bit more luck WW2 in Europe would have likely ended sooner and perhaps without the Red Army in Berlin. And there’s little question that the assassinations of men like Sadat and Rabin had definite effects on outcomes. To dismiss the effectiveness of targeted killing would be to dismiss the importance of leaders.