I want to solicit from my audience (or, possibly, audient) an explanation of the strategic significance of “breakout capability”. The CIA defines it:
Knowledge, infrastructure, and materiel, which usually lie beneath the threshold of suspicion, but which can be rapidly adapted or reorganized to allow for weaponization processes to be undertaken. Such capabilities require pre-disposed resources and often employ dual-use technology, equipment, or knowledge.
I understand the words but I don’t understand its strategic significance. For one thing has any country anywhere demonstrably sought “breakout capability” without subsequently going on to develop nuclear weapons? I can’t think of any.
This isn’t the 1940s. An ICBM can go from Nebraska to Tehran in just about a half hour and I presume the journey from Siberia or Xinjiang would be even shorter. So, taking the Iranians as our example, breakout capability wouldn’t deter us from doing anything we actually intended to do. The only candidate I can think of for such deterrence is Israel.
I’ve asked this question elsewhere without ever receiving an adequate answer.
I know this isn’t directed to me, but I think the point is that much of the strategic significance of having nuclear capabilities occurs when a country is perceived to have breakout capability, though I suppose the impact varies, it may create deterrence, it may increase tensions with neighboring countries, or encourage them to develop their own nuclear weapons, etc. The example I’ve read given for this is Pakistan, though I am not familiar with how that played out, and they did get the bomb.
The other example is Japan.
I would consider it useful for diplomatic negotiation. If Iran builds a bomb then it will never reach an agreement with the United States. If it doesn’t build a bomb it is militarily vulnerable and has no significant leverage at the bargaining table. In their position I’d develop the capacity to construct a weapon within a relatively short period of time and hold there while maintaining some ambiguity as to whether I’ve actually gone through with it. This gives them:
1) the threat and deterrence of a nuclear device without the repercussions of possessing one.
2) something (said capacity) they can trade. If they’d built an actual weapon they would have lost tremendous face in giving it up to the U.S. They would, I think, be stuck with it and locked into continued isolation. In that way a bomb would limit more than expand their options.
It looks to me like the entire thing was conducted in such a way as to wring concessions out of the U.S.
Japan may possess it but I don’t know of any evidence that it sought it. In other words I don’t know that it has any strategic implications for Japan.
Shaw is right about Japan. They’ve developed a lot of nuclear technology and put a velvet glove around it, but there’s clearly an iron (uranium?) fist behind the glove.
Canada’s another example. They mine a ton of uranium, are a leading producer of nuclear reactors, and the only source (in the West?) of many medical isotopes.
They could certainly make a bomb in short order if they wanted.
Frankly, we knew that North Korea and Pakistan were developing nuclear weapons but, especially with North Korea, I don’t think we knew exactly how close they were until they detonated a bomb. So I don’t think ‘breakout capability’ has much meaning – since if in 10 years, Iran did ‘green light’ nuclear weapon development, they’re unlikely to issue a press release about it.
Whether the ‘breakout time’ is 1 year, or 5 years, frankly, it’s irrelevant since it’s unlikely that the country in question would be preemptively attacked: You don’t want to attack close to the ‘breakout’ since there’s a realistic chance that you’re off in your timing estimate, the country already has at least 1 bomb, and by attacking you’re giving them incentive to use it, and you don’t want to attack shortly after development of a bomb starts, since there will be little evidence that the weapon development was started, and if anything, you’re telling the country that they were right to develop WMD, and that they need to be sneakier about it. (Or that they should try to buy a bomb from cash-strapped NK or Pakistan – a not unrealistic possibility).
Strategy is nice, but I wonder if the leadership of America can envision a culture, a people, a nation that has accepted as its’ mission to destroy others it considers inferior. These are Iranians, not Aryans(: . And this is 2015, not 1933. Can’t be a REAL threat.
27 OECD countries have nuclear power plants. Only 3 have nukes. The other 24 have inherent breakout capability. If Germany really wanted nukes they could easily build them in a year or two or less if they made it a priority.
Yes, it takes little time for an ICBM to get to Tehran. What is the probability that is our first military response to Iran? Nukes remain a defensive tool for the most part. They provide an extra level of assurance that you won’t get invaded. What is the probability that the US would want to invade Iran? Before Iraq I would have said close to zero.
Steve
Dave Schuler: The Logic of “Breakout Capabilityâ€
Breakout capability provides a country with a margin of safety, a deterrence to invasion. A long enough breakout capability gives those concerned a margin of safety to take action if the country moves forward with developing nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are 1940s technology. Any country can eventually acquire such technology. Eventually all countries will have the capability. It has to be shown not to be in their own best interest to build nuclear weapons. That is still a difficult diplomatic task considering the amount of residual instability in the global community.
Does anyone have actual evidence that breakout capability is a deterrent? Offhand I can’t think of any instances.
Hard to prove isn’t it? Countries don’t go invading each other as much as they used to do, but the instances I think of off the top of my head were countries that had neither nukes nor real breakout capability. You might be able to make a case that Iran itself is an example. I suspect the only reason Bush and co. did not bomb Iran was the assessment that it would only provoke them to actually make nukes. Perhaps the same with Israel, thought that may just be technical difficulties.
Steve
Some sort of confirming evidence would be nice.
For example, we don’t have incontrovertible proof that nuclear deterrence works but we have good reason to believe that it does. We didn’t nuke Hanoi for two reasons: we thought it would provoke a counter-attack and domestic political ones. We didn’t attack the Soviets directly and they didn’t attack us but limited ourselves to various varieties of proxy wars because of MAD.
Personally, I don’t think breakout is as big a deal as it’s made out to be except in a few specific circumstances. The thing that matters most is detecting a breakout – that’s much more important than how how long it would take. Generally, I agree with Jeffrey Lewis’s arguments in this article from March (obviously this is a few months old, so ignore the parts about the deal and negotiations as they are OBE):
http://www.vox.com/2015/3/31/8319103/iran-nuclear-jeffrey-lewis
Zachriel
“Breakout capability provides a country with a margin of safety, a deterrence to invasion. A long enough breakout capability gives those concerned a margin of safety to take action if the country moves forward with developing nuclear weapons.”
No, deterrence is provided by actual nukes, not potential ones. A country that actually attempts to breakout is inviting attack unless it could do so secretly and present a fait accompli – so a breakout capability is not a deterrent. In fact we’ve made it pretty clear that we’d attack Iran if they tried to build a bomb (and some people want to bomb them regardless), so I think the Iranians would disagree with you.
As far as states with a breakout capability, or what are called nuclear threshold states, the list is pretty short: Japan and Brazil for certain, but arguments could be made for others – South Korea, Canada, Argentina, perhaps a few more. Strategically I think it does matter – Japan and South Korea enjoy the US nuclear umbrella, but if that were to go away…..Brazil and Argentina are in a unique arrangement but it is one that may not endure. Things appear stable now, but that could change.
Dave Schuler: Does anyone have actual evidence that breakout capability is a deterrent?
If, say, Iraq were to try to invade Iran again, or even Russia, then they should be able to hold them off long enough to build a bomb if necessary. Knowing they can build a bomb is probably enough deterrence to prevent a repeat of the disastrous Iran-Iraq war.
steve: I suspect the only reason Bush and co. did not bomb Iran was the assessment that it would only provoke them to actually make nukes.
It’s certainly something that goes through the mind of military planners in Iran, especially considering the U.S. launched a preemptive ground war next door, and a major U.S. candidate for president openly advocated bombing Iran.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o-zoPgv_nYg
Andy: No, deterrence is provided by actual nukes,
As steve pointed out, Iran’s breakout capability certainly was considered by the Americans when they were considering an attack. It is also something a neighbor would consider before attacking.
Andy: A country that actually attempts to breakout is inviting attack unless it could do so secretly and present a fait accompli – so a breakout capability is not a deterrent.
The whole point is not to break out, but to have the capability. It’s a quasi-stable point between not having the capability and having the bomb. It provides some deterrence, some level of comfort. Of course, it’s not as comforting as actually having the bomb. Just ask the Americans.
Andy: In fact we’ve made it pretty clear that we’d attack Iran if they tried to build a bomb (and some people want to bomb them regardless), so I think the Iranians would disagree with you.
While the Iranians certainly think the Americans are very dangerous, they are not perceived as the invincible force they once were, having had their noses bloodied in Iraq, and a Shiite government with close ties to Iran installed there.
So you don’t.
Dave Schuler: So you don’t {have actual evidence that breakout capability is a deterrent}.
The evidence is that all the players to a dispute have to take into account breakout capability, and the uncertainties involved in those calculations. It makes an enemy think twice, and gives resident planners confidence that they have a plan B.
That’s just a restatement of the claim, not evidence.
“As steve pointed out, Iran’s breakout capability certainly was considered by the Americans when they were considering an attack. ”
The only context that we discuss attacking Iran is in the context of their nuclear program – if it weren’t for that, we wouldn’t be talking about bombing Iran and neither would the Israelis. Therefore, Iran’s breakout capability makes an attack on Iran more likely not less.
Second to that is the issue that an attack on Iran cannot accomplish what people like Dick Cheney wanted it to accomplish. That is the result of the inherent limitations of military power as applied to Iran to achieve a particular end (either destruction of Iran’s nuclear program or regime change). Be that as it may, if we detected Iran actually trying to break-out then we’d likely attack anyway.
Andy: Therefore, Iran’s breakout capability makes an attack on Iran more likely not less.
That is contradicted by even a cursory look at history. In the 1980s, for instance, Iran suffered a devastating war when it was invaded by Iraq, an aggression against international law, a war which involved chemical weapons, also against international law, and which was backed by the U.S.
“That is contradicted by even a cursory look at history. ”
Two points. First, in the current context, my argument stands. Secondly, it’s only contradicted historically if you believe in the counterfactual that an Iranian break-out capability would have deterred Saddam from attacking. I think you would be challenged to find any evidence to support that argument.
Andy: if you believe in the counterfactual that an Iranian break-out capability would have deterred Saddam from attacking.
Saddam would certainly have been inhibited by an Iran capable of building a nuclear weapon. Similarly, Saddam used his feigned breakout capability to deter his neighbors.
Deterrence is built on rational response. If Iran had breakout capability, and Iraq and the U.S. acted irrationally, Iran could have simply built the bomb and deployed it to stop Saddam.
Breakout logic, like concealed handgun logic, was created by people on their nice comfortable sofas in their safe living rooms. They have no real world experience with countries (or people) they project this logic onto.
Their thinking runs: Rounding up all the illegal Mexicans, busing them to the border, and tossing them over the fence would work as long as it could be done before Mexico had working nukes, but if Mexico had or almost had working nuclear weapons, they, including Donald Trump, would need a better plan.
Mexico, on the other hand, should realize that they would need not an arsenal of phantom nuclear weapons. They would need actual functioning, ready to go nuclear weapons. They would need twice as many as they think they would need. (This is where most bad guys go wrong. They always think they are smarter than they are.)
When you live in a place where your nine year old daughter sitting at her desk is doing her homework one minute and the next her brains are all over her homework because a stray bullet has come flying through the window, you tend to assume that anybody who had a gun is not hiding it. (I apologize, but I had to work that in there. If you know what it refers to, you should be pissed at people who claim to care.)
Saddam was playing a dangerous game. He probably thought that he had more than he did. It is turning out that there was more than nothing, but nothing on the scale that was claimed. He barely had a pest control program. He thought he had a WMD seed program with possibly a breakout capability, and everybody else thought he had WMD’s and a nuclear program. It was enough for the region, but he tried to step up to the big leagues.
Pakistan has nuclear weapons not nuclear breakout capabilities to deter India’s nuclear weapons, and India has nuclear weapons not nuclear breakout capabilities to deter a Pakistani invasion. Both thought and continue to think that real bombs against a real army are better than phantom bombs against a real army.
“Saddam would certainly have been inhibited by an Iran capable of building a nuclear weapon.”
I don’t think there’s any evidence for that assertion.
The problem with not having a bomb but having some capability to build one in some amount of time is that opponents may act to gain advantages while they still can – in other words, it can be the opposite of a deterrent.
Andy: I don’t think there’s any evidence for that assertion.
No rational player would ignore breakout capability. Saddam was not irrational, but considered his military options carefully, including the American response.
Indeed, Iran’s breakout capability is a very important consideration to military planners in the West.
“No rational player would ignore breakout capability.”
I’m not suggesting it would be ignored. As I’ve pointed out repeatedly now, it could do the opposite of deterrence and precipitate a war, particularly if an enemy thought it could prevent or delay the breakout through armed conflict.
“Indeed, Iran’s breakout capability is a very important consideration to military planners in the West.”
Of course it’s a consideration, just like a host of other factors that go into any military plan. That doesn’t mean it’s a deterrent.
Andy: it could do the opposite of deterrence and precipitate a war, particularly if an enemy thought it could prevent or delay the breakout through armed conflict.
Sure, if the attacker was sure to be able to capture the nuclear facility before the bomb was completed. As we mentioned above, it’s a quasi-stable point. How stable depends on the facts on the ground; how long is the breakout period, how reliable is the breakout, how weak are conventional defence forces to an attacker, etc.
Concerning your original point, Saddam knew he couldn’t take the entirety of Iran, but wanted to take the rich oil fields in Iran’s west. If Iran had nuclear breakout capability, Saddam’s army and his regime would have been vulnerable. Instead, the war became one of attrition (with the Americans providing logistical support to prevent a rout of the Iraqi forces).
The Iranians clearly want to maintain breakout capability, so their military planners consider it important to their defense.
” If Iran had nuclear breakout capability, Saddam’s army and his regime would have been vulnerable. ”
All the more reason for Saddam to try to take those oil fields before Iran actually had a bomb….I think if you look at history a bit more thoroughly you’ll find this type of decision-making is fairly common and is called “preventive war” by strategists. For more info please read this excellent monograph by Colin Gray.
Andy: All the more reason for Saddam to try to take those oil fields before Iran actually had a bomb
Unless Saddam could preempt the bomb-making capability of the Iranians, taking the oil fields would be of no final consequence.
Andy: For more info please read this excellent monograph by Colin Gray.
You citation contradicts your position saying preemption should significantly retard a nuclear program. Taking the oil fields would do nothing in this regard.
“Unless Saddam could preempt the bomb-making capability of the Iranians, taking the oil fields would be of no final consequence.”
For deterrence to work, the one being deterred must chose to be deterred. Given Saddam’s historic actions as well has the wealth of information we have on his decisionmaking processes, I think the opportunity presented by the Iranian Revolution would have overwhelmed an Iranian breakout capability in a decision to go to war with Iran. Iraq believed it would win a quick, decisive war and thereby gain significantly. Of course, it’s possible that Iraq may have been deterred since we are talking about a counterfactual. Regardless, today, Iran’s breakout capability makes war with Iran more likely not less.
“You citation contradicts your position saying preemption should significantly retard a nuclear program. ”
You need to read the whole thing…for instance there is a difference (explained in the monograph) between preemption and prevention and we are talking about the latter, not the former. And preventative war is exactly what the US and Israel threatened regarding Iran – hence the notion that a breakout capability is a deterrent is not a truism.
Anyway, I’ve made my case and feel that I’m just repeating myself at this point, so this will be my last comment on the topic.
Andy: And preventative war is exactly what the US and Israel threatened regarding Iran – hence the notion that a breakout capability is a deterrent is not a truism.
Yes, as we already stated. A breakout capability would not deter the U.S., which has to military capability to severely hamper nuclear efforts, but it would cause regional conventional powers to reconsider aggression.
Andy: Of course, it’s possible that Iraq may have been deterred
Then we are in agreement.