David Ignatius, the augur of the prevailing Washington wisdom, advises caution on continuing diplomacy with Iran. After hearing assertions from both the Iranian foreign minister and President Obama that extending talks past late March would not seem to serve any purposes, he notes:
The seeming impasse raises an unpleasant but essential question: What should the United States and Iran do if the talks fail? My answer would be that, at least initially, both sides would be wise to do nothing. It’s like a labor negotiation where both parties conclude that it’s in their interest to keep working by the old rules even after a contract has expired.
which echoes the observations I’ve made here. He goes on to explain the distance between the two parties on just one of the issues that divide them, the issue of sanctions.
It seems to me that these talks were wildly premature. Can diplomacy succeed in an environment of such mutual mistrust as exists between the United States and Iran? Or when each perceives the others loss as a gain? Those are questions not answers. I’d genuinely like to know more.
There is one thing that puzzles me. See this statement from Mr. Ignatius:
Iranians seem convinced that, with the rise of the terrorist Islamic State, the United States needs Iran’s help in Iraq. But the counterargument could also be made: Iran has chaos on its borders; a rupture in the talks would leave it fighting multiple enemies, with no reliable allies.
Is the rise of DAESH in Iran’s interests or not? If DAESH’s rise is in Iran’s interest (hard for me to fathom), why would they oppose them? To get a few sanctions lifted? To curry U. S. favor? If DAESH’s rise is not in their interest, do they really need negotiations with the U. S. to oppose it? Using something you already plan to do as a negotiating chip to gain further advantage is a time-honored strategy, cf. the recent U. S.-China agreement on global warming.
