Maybe I’m seeing things that aren’t really there but in a recent post at the RAND Blog I see hints of an explanation of why so much tripe has been said and written by so many otherwise intelligent people about North Korea. For example, quoting North Korea scholar Bruce Bennett:
Bennett has a story he likes to tell as a stage-setter in his briefings. Tensions were running high in the early 1990s. The leader of North Korea at the time, Kim Il Sung, called together his senior military officers and asked if they could win a war against the United States.
“Now remember,†Bennett says, “these were North Korean military people. What would they say? ‘We’re gonna win, yeah!’ But then he asked them: ‘If we lost, what do we do?’
“The North Korean military guys were all smart enough to know that was a really good time to keep your mouth shut. But his son, Kim Jong Il, the father of the current leader, spoke up and said, ‘If we lose, I will be sure to destroy the earth. What good is the earth without North Korea?’â€
which provides a hint as to North Korean grand strategy. Their interests aren’t limited to regime survival. The United States hasn’t threatened the existence of the Kim regime in more than 60 years other than by our very existence. They want Korean reunification, presumably by force, and a sort of aggressive “Samson option” to prevent the United States (or China) from intervening against them.
The present North Korean god-king, Kim Jong Un, is no Kim Il Sung. He isn’t even a Kim Jong Il. He’s crazier and less competent than either of them.
More:
He recognizes North Korea’s nuclear strategy as a Cold War throwback in part, a concept known as decoupling. If North Korea can threaten mainland America, then it can raise the stakes for any American intervention on behalf of South Korea. As Bennett puts it: “Are we prepared to trade San Francisco for Seoul?â€
I don’t think that’s the real question. The more relevant question is whether the residents of Honolulu, Anchorage, or San Francisco are willing to trade their cities for Pyongyang? Here’s another question: how will the present regime react to a threat to its existence from within?
My view continues to be that while we should be prepared to respond to attacks, preferably with a preemptive attack of overwhelming force, we shouldn’t respond to risks as though they were issues. Diplomacy has failed and is less likely to be successful with a North Korea led by Kim Jong Un than it was under Kim Jong Il. Strategic patience has been a complete flop. As long as we’re not willing to take steps to motivate China to stop supporting the Kim regime, we can’t ourselves mitigate the risks that North Korea presents and we shouldn’t pretend that we can.
That’s correct. And as I’ve pointed out repeatedly, if we aren’t ready to play hardball with China now (or a period measured in months) then we make a greivous error in allowing NKs nuclear effort to mature. Clinton, Bush and Obama all made that reckless error. The numb nuts ought to quit the pure tripe over statues and start thinking seriously and aggressively about China. Trade wars may be ugly, but nuclear ones are worse.
It’s possible we may not be able to avert the worst outcome, so we must prepare materially AND mentally. Unbelievably bad things DO happen, but that’s not the end, only the beginning of the aftermath.
Also, pray, if you’re so inclined.
The problem is, We do not have overwhelming force. A Korean war is an infantry war because of the terrain, and we have very little infantry that is not already committed elsewhere. It would take two to three months to bring enough infantry into theater to matter, and during that time the South is on its own.
Moreover, this time the war might not last a month. All North Korea has to do is capture Seoul intact, with its population, a few hundred thousand foreigners, the various bureaucracies and its industry. Seoul can be encircled in a few days and occupied in a week or two. Then we have the World’s biggest hostage situation.
I bet Pres. Moon caves.
We do not have overwhelming conventional force.
Ok, let’s play this out.
In this scenario the real question with China is not about them but about us: What leverage are we actually willing to bring to bear on China to get them turn the screws on North Korea. Vague hand waving about playing hardball with them means nothing without some sense of what we are willing to pay or endure to for a change in Chinese policy. China is not going to destabilize the DPRK simply because we strongly insist.
We will have to coerce them in a credible way, or agree to some quid-pro-quo. Maybe for a quid pro quo we could offer them free reign in the South China Sea – or maybe offer up Taiwan. I think that’s the ballpark of the price we would have to pay for China to to essentially fuck the DPRK and create a failed state on its border.
The other option is coercion and we don’t exactly have a good track record when it comes to credible threats. The only time we’ve successfully played hard-ball recently is with Pakistan right after 9/11 and look how well that turned out.
I’m thinking commercial, Andy. Why are we educating Chinese in our schools. Why are we trading? The Chinese economy is much more tenuous than people think, and has been propped up by credit expansion. A trade war would be a major headache for them with lots of civil unrest. And for what? Kim? I don’t think they think we have designs on their buffer state, or reunification. All they have to do is control the little shit. I just don’t think they think we are serious. Why would they? We haven’t been for at least 3 presidencies.
As for infantry wars. Seriously? The reason this whole thing is so serious is that infantry war isn’t an option.
“The Chinese economy is much more tenuous than people think, and has been propped up by credit expansion. A trade war would be a major headache for them with lots of civil unrest.”
How do you operationalize that? It’s an easy thing to say, it’s not so easy as a tool to compel Chinese action in an unrelated area.