In prior posts I’ve pointed out how much of one’s reactions to the incipient deal with Iran on its nuclear development program depends on one’s assumptions. This morning I’ve found two newspaper columns that place the opposing points of view and the assumptions that underpin them in stark relief.
At the Washington Post Eugene Robinson proclaims the deal a “great accomplishment”:
Under the Geneva pact, half of Iran’s 20 percent uranium will be diluted and no more will be produced. A military strike that eliminated half of the potential fuel for a “breakout†bomb — and wiped out the capability to make more — would surely be reckoned a success. It is just plain dumb to attack Kerry and Obama for achieving the same thing without firing a shot.
Critics can’t plausibly oppose the agreement on practical grounds. The real reason they are freaking out is that the agreement was made possible by the most extensive high-level bilateral contacts between Washington and Tehran since the 1979 Iranian revolution. This has the potential to reshape the whole region — to the detriment of those vested in the status quo.
The primary assumption here is the one I’ve already mentioned: good faith on the part of the Iranians. If the Iranians use the six months to further the aspects of weapons development they haven’t already mastered, that doesn’t sound like a success to me.
The questions I have for proponents of the deal are a) what evidence do they have either for good faith on the part of the Iranian regime or that future agreements are in the offing? and b) does the agreement make sense as a one-off, is it worthwhile solely on its own strengths?
Bret Stephens, on the other hand, writing at the Wall Street Journal, immediately instantiates Godwin’s Law and declaims the deal as “worse than Munich”, referring to the appeasement of Hitler in the meetings there in 1938:
After Geneva there will come a new, chaotic Mideast reality in which the United States will lose leverage over enemies and friends alike.
What will that look like? Iran will gradually shake free of sanctions and glide into a zone of nuclear ambiguity that will keep its adversaries guessing until it opts to make its capabilities known. Saudi Arabia will move swiftly to acquire a nuclear deterrent from its clients in Islamabad; Saudi billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal made that clear to the Journal last week when he indiscreetly discussed “the arrangement with Pakistan.” Egypt is beginning to ponder a nuclear option of its own while drawing closer to a security alliance with Russia.
As for Israel, it cannot afford to live in a neighborhood where Iran becomes nuclear, Assad remains in power, and Hezbollah—Israel’s most immediate military threat—gains strength, clout and battlefield experience. The chances that Israel will hazard a strike on Iran’s nuclear sites greatly increased since Geneva. More so the chances of another war with Hezbollah.
That makes its own set of assumptions, for example, that the Iranians want a nuclear weapon, that there’s anything we could do at this point short of all-out war to prevent Iran from producing a nuclear weapon, that U. S. influence in the region isn’t already ebbing, and that isn’t a good thing.
I still haven’t reached any conclusions. Frankly, I doubt that either of the extreme scenarios are likely to come to pass and am inclining to the view that the agreement is a purely political act that won’t achieve anything material one way or another. But my mind is still open on the subject and I’m amenable to persuasion.
Suppose we dont make the agreement. They still dont stop what they are doing. The only way you really stop them if they want to make a bomb is to occupy them. (Per Stephens, it sounds like Israel has a real problem. They dont know how to share well, only how to dominate and attack their neighbors. Their unwillingness to compromise on anything makes them a bad ally for us.)
Steve
Under the Geneva pact, half of Iran’s 20 percent uranium will be diluted and no more will be produced.
Supposedly the uranium dilution can be reversed when the mullahs want to reestablish it’s potency. So, it’s an agreement creating a superficial process of “hibernation”, not elimination, that is being touted by Kerry/Obama.
For over a decade Iran has been pursuing nuclear capability. However, the uranium enrichment reflects more of a military bent than for purposes of energy production — their proclaimed intentions. Couple this with Iran’s support of terrorism all over the region, their hateful comments towards Israel, and I don’t see how one can linger on continuing confusion as to what their long-term goals are. And, waiting for something to come to pass before venturing a conclusion, seems like a marriage of caution wedded to foolishness, IMO
Israel, though, is well aware that it resides in the midst of adversaries having blind hatred for them — wanting them gone, sooner rather than later. It’s also reality-hardened by earlier professed antagonism towards their people, resulting in annihilating millions of them. So, I think it’s fair to say they will live by the wisdom of “hoping for the best, but preparing for the worst.” Their vehement opposition to the Geneva conditions –loosening sanctions already in place with Iran — has probably dashed hopes for the best, leaving them leaning towards the worst-case-scenario — proceeding ahead with their own Iranian disarmament plan, possibly in tandem with the Saudis, who also expressed dismay and dissatisfaction with the Geneva Agreement..
Consequently, I personally speculate that the agreement pushed by the U.S. has done little to nothing implementing peace. Instead, it has actually added greater instability to the ME by increasing a defensive movement towards nuclear proliferation in that region, as well as create a baffling aura of cognitive dissonance around the United States in how they manage a ticking time bomb like Iran. Add this silly, ineffective retreat from Middle Eastern problems, to the foreign policy resume of the Obama Administration, and it appears to be compressing tensions, not ameliorating them. The future explosions, when they come to fruition, will be grim.
First, as I’ve written many times over the years, it makes perfect sense for the Iranians to want nukes in their part of the world. That does NOT mean they’re actually persuing a nuclear program, just that it does make sense for them to do so. Also, this would be true for a more Western-friendly government as well as the current government. (I do believe they’re working on a bomb program, but that isn’t my point here.)
Second, this talk of “worse than Munich” is silly. I can think of at least two examples from the 1940s that are worse than this.
Steve, compromise for the Israelis is a stupid idea. A glance at a map shows why.
However, I agree with you that we shouldn’t let Israel dictate our foreign policy. Our primary concern should be our own interests.
The problem with the “Munich in 1938” reasoning is that it can only be recognized if nothing is done. The 2003 invasion of Iraq could have prevented a “Munich in 1938” situation, but we will never know. Even if we assume it was, we still do not know if it would have been worse. Saddam controlling the ME may have been better, but we will never know.
I find it interesting that now that the Israeli planes have a fuel/distance problem they are positing a Israeli/Saudi alliance. Using Saudi air bases for refueling is more involved than pulling up to pump and saying “fill ‘er up”.
I am also amazed that everybody has figured out the Saudi/Pakistan relationship. Where do people think Pakistan got the money for a successful nuclear program?
Does anybody believe that if China had a problem with N. Korea having nuclear weapons, that N. Korea would have nuclear weapons?
… Look at the demographics of Israel. What happens if they never compromise? They have to have apartheid or deport 1/3 of their country. No compromise means they keep the West Bank. That works if the Arabs just roll over. Hasnt happened yet. No compromise just means eternal war. Look at the neighbors again and project how that works out.
Steve
Steve points to the source of my discomfort with a close relationship between the United States and Israel. Israel exists to be a Jewish state, a state with a Jewish character. How do they accomplish that with a sizeable Arab population? How would they accomplish that with a majority Arab population? While I recognize that Israel is the best liberal democracy in the Middle East I don’t see how Israel remains Jewish and a liberal democracy. IMO Israel as a Jewish state is difficult to reconcile with our national values or interests.
If israel becomes an Arab state, what is the likelihood it remains a liberal state? If the Jews in Israel compromise with the Arabs, giving them full rights and a big chunk of land, are the Arabs going to stop outbreeding the Jews?
And is another Arab state, with all that inevitably entails, in line with our national values?
That’s pretty much why I think we should maintain a lower profile with respect to Israel than we presently do. If the Israelis can make their experiment work, I’d salute them. I’m not sure we want to leave our fingerprints all over that experiment in the event of its failure.