Sources of Middle East Violence

At National Interest historian Lorenzo Kamel notes that it’s a lot easier to analogize the upheaval in the Middle East to the Thirty Years War in 17th century Europe if you don’t know much about either of them:

Both the Thirty Years’ War (a non-proxy conflict) and the many proxy wars in today’s Middle East show that religious issues alone can explain little. Four centuries ago, France, the Habsburgs, the German princes (whose conversion had little to do with theology and much with asserting their power) and other regional players clashed for very practical reasons. The same applies to the present-day Middle East, where cleavages and sectarian strife have much to do with economics, the short- and long-term effects of nationalism, and ongoing geopolitical dynamics.

In this respect, the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 and, more recently, the United States’ nonintervention in Syria, have been perceived by Saudi Arabia as indirect aid to Iran’s strategies. Largely as a consequence of this, over the last five years Riyadh has invested an enormous amount of resources in opposing the rise of any government or party that, in the Arab world, could have represented a credible alternative to the “Saudi model.” This also explains Riyadh’s decision to support the Egyptian army in the coup against former Islamist president Mohamed Morsi.

It doesn’t help that there are three countries that have actively promoted violence in the region for national or political gain:

  1. The United States
  2. Saudi Arabia
  3. Iran

Saudi Arabia and Iran are mostly Sunni Muslim and Shi’a Muslim, respectively. That doesn’t mean that when they pursue the interests of their respective regimes they’re doing so for religious reasons. Or, more precisely, both countries conflate their regimes’ objectives with religious ones.

3 comments… add one
  • Gray Shambler Link

    When He was asked why the USA supports Saudi Arabia while they export Wahhabism and finance terrorists, President Obama smiled, and said, it’s complicated.
    I’ve read somewhere that we do that because we want the Saudis to only accept DOLLARS for oil thus maintaining our currency as the worlds reserve currency, which strengthens the dollar and allows our government to continue to run budget deficits that defy gravity.
    Anyone here able to clarify or support that?

  • Or, said another way, there are relative priorities. That’s something that I and I think the American people understand, as even most three year olds do. However, it’s good to know what the relative priorities are.

    Just as there are relative priorities there are relative benefits. Who benefits more from the dollar being the reserve currency (not as true as it once was)? Who benefits more from security against terrorism? As Lucius Cassius noted, Cui bono?

    Note, too, that once you have turned to a comparative advantages case, you’re no longer free to return to a kritikal argument without muddling your own position hopelessly. You pays your money and you takes your choice.

    Anybody who claims the U. S. supports Saudi Arabia to defend the petrodollar is fighting the last war. The petrodollar is largely a thing of the past. Oil is already being traded in currencies other than the dollar.

    I would be more inclined to say that the dollar’s status as reserve currency is dependent on the relative security of the United States and the power of the U. S. economy rather than Saudi foreign policy.

  • bob sykes Link

    Frankly, American foreign and military policy since the fall of the USSR looks more like a temper trantrum than a plan.

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