Fred Hyatt produces a timeline of the unfolding disaster in Syria. Read it and weep. Our posture can’t be defended from the standpoint of realism.
You can support the rebels, support Assad, or just butt out. What we’re doing is condemning Assad and providing tepid support for the rebels. That’s not realism. The realist position is the one the Russians are taking: support Assad. Our position is sadism.
Our position is to waffle, dither, verbally empathize and/or criticize, waiting for someone else to step in, either to give us a shove or take over the situation entirely. In the meantime, there may be some behind-the-scenes, profitable gun-running that will remain nothing but a ghostly and strenuously refuted rumor.
My view is that in actions we are supporting Assad, even if our rhetoric denies this. A couple of writers at AEI apparently think this may be purposeful realpolitik, based on the assumption that Iran is the only regional player with long term stability. I doubt that this is actual strategy, but it does seem that liberal interventionism based on humanitarian crisis is dead and we may end up in this situation by default. We don’t have any good alternatives anyway.
Butt out. This is a case where we probably want both sides to lose.
Steve
Steve:
We don’t like either side but increasing the unrest and chaos in the Middle East is not in our interest. Right now we’re supporting the rebels rhetorically and with “non-lethal aid”. Since such aid is fungible, it’s a meaningless distinction.
The Realpolitik solution is holding our nose and supporting Assad, at least rhetorically. But that’s opposed to our alleged values. Under the circumstances the effective position staked out by the administration is to maximize the suffering of the Syrian people to weaken opposing sides, neither of which we like. If that’s not sadism I don’t know what else to call it. But it certainly isn’t Realpolitik.
If we had actually butted out (rather than what we’ve actually done) both rhetorically and actually and encouraged our allies to do the same in no uncertain terms, I suspect that Assad would already have put down the rebellion. Basically, we’ve cynically encouraged people to rebel against Assad and they’ve concluded they would get more support than we’re willing to give.
Basically, we’ve cynically encouraged people to rebel against Assad and they’ve concluded they would get more support than we’re willing to give.
I seem to recall this happening in 1956 somewhere, too.
But one doesn’t need to conclude cynicism so much as incompetence. Why wouldn’t the Syrian rebels conclude that we would help them? We had already helped overthrow the governments in Libya in Egypt, in one case by direct military intervention, and in the other by withdrawing support. The Syrians rebels made a more rational decision, in my opinion, than the Hungarians did.
I’m more interested in why we encouraged this, and even have allies in the region supporting the move, and have then backed down. After all the gaffes concerning red lines in the sand and the President routinely under-cutting the Secretary of State it’s hard for me to envision there’s some grand strategy, or any strategy, at work here.
Reading about cases like Hungary in the history books, or living through cases like Syria now, I’m really of the opinion that US leaders need to SHUT THE FUCK UP about the internal affairs of other countries, unless they’re prepared to do whatever it takes to enforce their opinion. That would have meant starting WWIII in the case of Hungary (weren’t gonna do it), or invading Syria with a large force in the current situation (aren’t gonna do it).
Call it the STFU policy, and it would have pretty much ruled out every single person we’ve nominated for the major parties in the last 22 years from being elected President, if followed assiduously by the electorate.
Hmm, would that have ruled out Perot? I think Perot might have signed on for this one, but I don’t really remember his foreign policy views outside of trade.
Exactly. There is no such thing as optimistic idealism AKA liberal interventionism on the cheap. If he or she has no intention of actual intervention the limit of what an idealist president can say is
As I’ve said above, a realist president would have supported Assad.
“If he or she has no intention of actual intervention the limit of what an idealist president can say…….”
Related: Colin Powell said the primary lesson he took from the Vietnam War was that once you make that awful decision to go, you go full bore, to win and win fast. “Overwhelming force” was his term.
On the opposite side, I think our enemies know that their best bet now is to prosecute wars through the media.
@Dave Schuler
As I’ve said above, a realist president would have supported Assad.
He could have said that this was an internal problem for Syria; the US would supply aid for refugees; and, military action in Turkey will result in a NATO response.
This would leave the ME players free to act without implicit US support. The Saudi and Sunni countries could support the rebels, and Israel could bomb whatever they wanted. All would have been fighting a proxy war against Iran.
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf States, and the non-Hezbollah controlled areas of Lebanon are far more threatened by Iran than Israel.
In order to influence an area, there must be a physical presence – air bases, troops, commercial, cultural. In the ME, a hard presence is not going to be replaced by a soft one any time soon.
With the Iraq invasion, bungled follow-up, and withdrawal, the US has little ability to influence the area. Much like the eventual nuclear Iran, the US needs to accept this.
I think I went off-topic somewhere.
@Drew
On the opposite side, I think our enemies know that their best bet now is to prosecute wars through the media.
Propaganda used to weaken the enemy’s will to fight or to undermine his justification to fight is as old as war/politics. The medium may be new, but the tactic is not. The youth and leisure class are primary targets.
Dave- I cannot see much of an upside to supporting either group. I think that even realists should realize that sometimes it is so hard to choose sides that you shouldn’t. I guess you can make a case for better stability in the region if you support Assad, but even that seems kind of weak. (You dont really think the Russians are supporting Assad out of any realist motivations I hope. They want their port. What do we gain from supporting him?)
Steve
Wouldn’t supporting the Syrians for the use of port facilities count as realist? I’m asking because all of a sudden I’m thinking the term does not mean what I think it means.
I’m also not sure how the President wanting to go to Tehran, or the reported US negotiations with Hezbollah, are supposed to fit into any of this. We’re apparently on both sides in this conflict, or all three if ou think of the rebels comprising two separate groups, which is much worse than being on no side UNLESS you REALLY know what you’re doing. And I don’t think that ANY US Administration has really known what it was doing in the foreign policy realm since … I’m drawing a blank here.
Kissinger, the poster-boy for realism, could arguably be called a sadist for the various covert actions he implemented in the 1970’s. I think the realist position is also the sadistic one in the case of Syria.
Syria is a problem with no good solutions and America’s ability to be a positive force there is minimal at best. There are many, many opportunities for American interference to cause more harm than good.
Tasty
I know, it just seems to have been an efficacious tactic starting in the Middle East. I’m not impressed that either the Germans or Japanese would have gotten very far with the technique.
I think there’s some confusion about the term “realism” as it applies to foreign policy. Realism is a term of art in international relations. It refers to the idea that states are competitive and pursue their own interests the most basic interest being survival.
Pursuit of a warm water Mediterranean port is a realist objective. Ideals like the freedom, justice, self-determination, or even the safety of people other than your own are idealist objectives. They are not realist objectives, particularly when pursued in the context of an order of international institutions and law (which are themselves idealist institutions).
Characterization of the president as a foreign policy realist is absurd on its face. The statement can only be made if you don’t understand what is meant by “realism” in this context.
We have actual interests in the Middle East and one of the most compelling is stability. Stability supports our interests. Uncertainty does not nor does the certainty that there are alternatives to Assad even more vile than Assad and which we can do very little to prevent from coming to power if Assad were to be removed without direct military intervention, politically very difficult at this time.
That’s why I say that we are not pursuing a realist foreign policy with respect to Syria but Russia is. We aren’t pursuing our interest (stability) and we are pursuing idealist objectives through international institutions. That is, by definition, not a realist foreign policy.
Sorry if I was unclear. I dont think the Russians are realists, they just want their port, IOW I dont see them as having adopted realism. (I could be wrong. You could certainly interpret their arm twisting of the Ukraine in that manner.) Maybe my working definition of realism is too nuanced as I believe it entails more than just power politics. At any rate, I still dont see that we advance our interests significantly by supporting Assad. This rebellion started under his rule, so I am not so certain about his ability to maintain stability. It is also not clear to me that he is any better than the other factions would be if they were running the country. I expect continued uprisings and meddling in the area no matter who runs Syria.
Steve
When a country supports ‘realism,’ it becomes an insensitive brute, in only looking out for it’s own self interests. You can say the U.S. was a realist in how it supported Saddam Hussein versus Iran. However, as the ME became more complicated after 911, with threats of terrorism blooming in Iraq, we continued to be realists, doing a 180 turnabout, in supporting our own national interests by discontinuing a tenuous relationship with Hussein and going to war with him, ultimately ousting him from power.
Syria has also been a peripheral terrorist regime for a long time, akin to the Axis of Evil countries as ascribed by Bush — Iraq, N. Korea and Iran. However, as vile as Assad has been he’s probably better, in the long run, than Hezbollah or the Tilaban being in power. But, the violent, inhumane treatment of his people, in order to retain power, defies all that we supposedly hold dear — the sanctity of human life. Nonetheless, this administration just can’t make up it’s mind which path to follow — protecting the human rights of another country, or keeping a tyrant in power because they are the best of an awful Middle Eastern lot. So, it seems to have turned into a shell game, where the Obama Administration keeps moving the pod around, cajoling, taunting, but never really having a fixed opinion or follow-through — promises that evaporate or simply mutate into something completely different, moment to moment.
I personally think the U.S. should develop a concise, consistent foreign policy where it has clear definitions of what it will get involved with and what it won’t. This is said with the assumption that we are still a super power in the world, which, IMO, means having the responsibility of being a stabilizer in areas where instability exists. Isolating ourselves from world problems used to be a sensible option for this country, blessed with natural geographical protection — the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. However, with advanced military technology, penetrable borders, ocean and air currents making us susceptible to radiation toxicity, we are forced to get involved with other people’s problems — including keeping nuclear armaments out of the hands of the irresponsible.
Being in such a powerful position also means we have to maintain the respect of other countries — saying what we mean, as well as meaning what we say. The vacillation shown by this administration, though, has weakened our reputation around the world. We are neither respected nor feared, making us more of a ‘nothing’ when considerations are made by other countries struggling with their own enemies, economies and social problems. And, standing aside, being out of the world loop, does not make the world safer, by any measure.
A thoughtful commentary, by Walter Russell Mead, discussing our foreign policy means, and what might be the unintended ends because of it. The End of History Ends
Dave,
I don’t agree that a realist policy for US would be to support Assad as Russia does. While stability is important, it isn’t our only interest and it’s not at all clear that supporting Assad, especially at this point, would bring stability. Supporting Assad would require us to do a 180 and would go against the efforts of our regional allies.
A realist policy, IMO, is one where we use proxies to oppose the aims of our competitors. In this case, our competitors are Iran and Russia and our proxies are the Saudis, the other GCC states and Turkey. And then there is Israel – they think a stalemated civil war is good for them. Unfortunately, the realist policy doesn’t help the Syrian people, quite the opposite.
Regardless, I think the US doesn’t have much influence in Syria and there isn’t the domestic political support for anything decisive.
The problem with a turn toward non-interventionism is that we still get backlash from prior interventionism (added to other reasons that pur enemies oppose us.) So when we withdraw, we are vulnerable.
Is there a historical model for such a transition? Britain, maybe?
In thinking about that analogy, peace wasn’t exactly restored when Britain backed off of it’s commitment to the Balfour agreement. And that goes to my point- what has been done can not be easily undone. By committing to Zionism in the first place, the conflict was set in motion.
This is what I don’t understand about modern non-intervention advocates. It’s not as though our actions going forward will be judged on their merits, without regard to past actions.
CStanley- I think that is actually a good point, but I dont think that should bind us to intervention everywhere, all of the time. In a situation like Syria I dont think we have clear interests. I dont think we would know how to accomplish them if we could figure them out. Sometimes we just need to say we dont know enough to act, then not act. To paraphrase Bacevich, there are limits to American power. You might also want to consider the sunk costs fallacy.
Steve
jan- I dont think staying out of just one war for a change makes us isolationist. (In fact I think making such a claim borders on hysteria. Our problem is most definitely not that we are reticent about getting involved in wars.) I think most people would agree that the reasons for our intervention in Libya were a bit weak. However, in Libya we had international support and it was pretty easy to achieve our goal of removing Gadaffi. Even if we could identify some interests in Syria, heaven knows how we would achieve them.
Steve
@Drew
Before the US entered WW2, there was a media campaign portraying Germany and the Nazis as good, clean, Americans.
During the 1930’s and 50’s, there was a Soviet Union to undermine the US, and this was far more menacing than today’s threats.
History goes back further than the 20th century, and if I remember correctly, the Greeks and Romans made similar complaints.
Andy:
I agree that it’s too late for such a position now. At this point there are no good options left. However, I think the one thing we should not do is support the rebels.
steve:
The Russians are pursuing realist objectives using realist strategies. How can that be anything other than realist?
I think you’re confusing “foreign policy realist” with colloquial “realistic”.
@Dave Schuler
I think a realpolitik based foreign policy is different from a realist based foreign policy. I believe that the present use of the word “realist” is to distinguish it from President Bush’s foreign policy, and it is a marketing term. I suspect that this is what you are getting at.
I do not think that the US could have supported Assad. There is the Russian and Iranian ties that would supercede any US ones. After Mubarak and Gaddafi, I doubt anybody will trust the US.
I don’t, either. We don’t pursue a realist foreign policy. Bush was a foreign policy idealist. Obama is a foreign policy idealist. As you say, trying to distinguish between them is marketing.
However, most of the world doesn’t see us that way. They look at the way that we’ve encouraged the Syrian rebels or Egyptian liberal democrats, then look at how little we’ve done, consider our capabilities, and decide it’s a calculated strategy on our part.
This was one of my many objections to the Libyan adventure. We were pursuing idealist objectives using an idealist strategy. France and Italy on the other hand were very clearly pursuing realist objectives and cleverly getting our support for those objectives. That’s something I don’t believe we should involve ourselves in. France and Italy should do their own dirty work.
@Dave Schuler
… France and Italy on the other hand were very clearly pursuing realist objectives and cleverly getting our support for those objectives. …
An important point that is often not understood.
Could be, but I think realism means, among other things, setting policy that is realistic. Policy based upon ideology, we will turn Iraq into Sweden, is not bothered by considerations of what is possible.
Steve
As I said, it’s a term of art. I’ve given you the definition which you can verify for yourself. I don’t get to make up my own definitions for terms of art in international relations any more than I get to make up my own definition for medical terms.