There’s a large number of contractors in Iraq, many performing tasks which, in the past, would have been performed by military personnel. I’ve seen some estimates that suggest something like 150,000. How, if at all, does the number of contractors factor into the calculations of adequate troop strength for counterinsurgency operations? How does it factor into the tooth-to-tail ratio?
As usual with these “point of information posts” I’m genuinely looking for information. Are there any informed people out there who can comment on these questions?
Dave,
You might want to check out the comment section from this post on Intel Dump:
http://inteldump.powerblogs.com/posts/1174246123.shtml
MSR Roadkill, JD Henderson, FDChief are commenters who are particularly credible. You can also read the Slate article by the blogs’ author, Phil Carter:
http://www.slate.com/id/2098571
To summarize, the vast majority of contractors in Iraq perform essentially non-military functions like running dining facilities, the motor pool, cleaning latrines, etc. Many of these contracted functions save the military a significant amount of money when one looks at the legacy costs of an equivalent servicemember.
As for how contractors factor into troop strength calculations, that is difficult to factor. Prior to the surge, most of our troops operated from established bases, or FOBs, that were heavily dependent on contractors to provide services. Now that troops are moving into small posts within Baghdad the need for contractor support has probably decreased. So, in large part, the strategy drives the requirements for contractor support. Where the military is relatively stationary, working from secure areas, contractors can be used extensively. When the military is conducting mobile kinetic warfare – like the beginning stages of OIF prior to Saddam’s overthrow, the utility of contractors decreases dramatically because, for the most part, they can’t defend themselves. Even so, it’s clear that large conventional forces cannot operate for any extended period of time without some kind of contractor support.
Thanks for the links, Andy. I thought the comment thread in particular was extremely interesting (as well as being extremely lengthy) but neither actually addressed my question.
I haven’t read the latest COIN handbook (I believe that Gen. Petraeus was its author) but my understanding is that it posits some number of troops needed to deal with an insurgency. My question, simply put, is who does that include?
My comfort scale in using contractors varies depending on what they’re actually doing from scullery (at the most comfortable end) to actual combat (at the least comfortable end). Two things I insist on. First, that military contractors should be subject to the UCMJ. Second, if arms-bearing military contractors are to be tolerated at all, their sole customers should be governments.
Dave,
Gen. Petraeus is NOT the author of the new COIN manual. He was in charge of the organization that produced it and participated in the production process.
To answer your question directly, it depends. Each insurgency is different and has unique qualities that affect the number and type of forces needed. US involvement can range from less than 100 personnel in the case of El Salvador all the way up to 160k plus in the case of Iraq.
As for who the numbers include, the COIN manual isn’t explicit, but does make specific provisions for using and incorporating contractor personnel into COIN operations. Based on that, I believe that some contractor personnel would be included in ratio calculations while others would not. The COIN manual states:
Most contractors would not be considered “security forces” in a COIN environment.
In short, it’s not clear. I suggest you download the COIN manual and read the sections on contractors as it provides additional information that may provide you some additional context.