Tigerhawk draws our attention to an extremely interesting handout from the Center for Strategic and International Studies: twenty questions we need to answer in assessing the Iranian threat.
To add clarity and intellectual rigor to this debate, CSIS has prepared a list of issues—“20 questionsâ€â€”intended to highlight these points of divergence. Few people will agree on the answers to all 20 questions. They differ sometimes on the basis of fact, and other times on the basis of judgment. Yet, it is precisely those answers that determine both the threats and opportunities contained
in Iran’s actions and the world’s potential responses.
In the interest of promoting a healthy debate on these issues, CSIS has not only laid out the questions, but it has also prepared two opposing responses for each question to help illustrate the vibrancy of the debate. Although CSIS as an institution has no position on these questions, the wide range of experts at CSIS provides equally wide-ranging analysis.
One thing I found confusing in CSIS’s presentation: they change the position of the “Yes†and “No†answers and the shading of the blocks from left to right seemingly at random. I believe both sides of each question are presented fairly.
Indeed, I don’t believe that either answer to any of these questions is clearly right or clearly wrong. People of good will can believe either. Nonetheless I think the questions provide a good device for clarifying one’s own thoughts on the subject.
In that spirit I’ll attempt to provide my own answers to the questions. Maybe, if I have the time and inclination, I’ll provide links to posts of mine in which I’ve considered each of them.
1. Are we sure that Iran wants to develop a nuclear weapons capability?
I think that “Sure†is too strong a word. I think that the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that Iran is, in fact, developing nuclear weapons. I also don’t think that we should believe that certitude is required before we take a position or embark on a course of action in dealing with the matter.
2. Will we know if Iran has reached a “point of no return†on a nuclear weapons program?
No. Our human intelligence in Iran is horrible and has been for decades. The only thing we know with certainty is that Iran has not been forthcoming about its nuclear development program.
3. Would a nuclear-armed Iran strike a devastating blow against regional security?
Devastasting, no. Very, very serious, yes. I believe that the nations in the region (correctly) view Iran as desiring to expand its influence and will move to counter that as necessary. I think that a nuclear arms race in the region would be inevitable under the circumstances.
4. Is the Iranian regime likely to collapse and, if so, under what conditions?
No. Barring some dramatic turn of events the regime is ruthless and canny enough to sustain itself.
5. Would a sharp drop in oil prices threaten regime stability?
No. Same reasons.
6. Are more moderate forces in Iran likely to rein in President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad?
No. I think that viewing President Ahmadinejad as being some sort of loose cannon rather than an expression of the majority opinion among the ruling oligarchy is an error.
7. Could the reformist movement in Iran return?
Sure. Anything can happen. But, again, absent some dramatic turn of events I think it’s unlikely and we certainly shouldn’t rely on such a thing to inform our policies.
8. Do events in Iraq harm the Iranian government at home?
I think that on balance Iran believes the current situation in Iraq is operating to its benefit. Otherwise they’d stop supplying the insurgency and Shi’ite militias.
9. How destabilizing would it be if Iran pulled its oil off world markets, were precluded from selling in world markets, or obstructed the shipment of its neighbors’ oil?
I think that the effects of an interruption of Iran’s oil production have been exaggerated. As evidence I’d present the fact that IIRC the price of oil has tripled since 1999 without noticeable destabilization.
10. Are Iranian conventional forces a threat to its neighbors?
No. However, its support for terrorists and other irregulars are. And, of course, nuclear weapons would not only make Iran a regional power but a world power (IMO the difference between a regional power and a world power is nuclear weapons).
11. Would an Iranian response to a military strike be significant?
I don’t think Iran’s conventional capabilities are sufficient for its response using conventional weapons and military to be significant. However, I think its support for terrorists and other irregulars and its likely possession of non-conventional weaponry renders military strikes daunting.
12. Will Israel strike Iran?
No. Israel can’t practically strike against Iran without a by-your-leave from the United States and, if we give such permission, we may as well do the dirty work ourselves. This is not Osirak. Further, I think that depending on Israel to pull our onions out of the fire is foolhardy. Additionally, Iran is enormously larger, more powerful, and wealthier than Iraq. I don’t believe that the gain to Israel in such an attack would be worth its risk to Israel. I have no doubt that, if Israeli officials believed an attack from Iran were imminent, they would preempt with enormous ferocity. Absent that they’ll leave Iran alone.
13. Could a military strike eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat?
I think the most honest answer to this question is “We don’t knowâ€. In all likelihood the most it would do is delay it and it might not even do that. The only sort of military strike that we could be absolutely certain would eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat would be a genocidal one (which we have the physical ability to carry out but not, I believe, the political).
14. Will China play a constructive role in the UN Security Council vis-Ã -vis Iran?
No. The best we can expect from China is that they’ll sit on the sidelines hoping that Iran and the West will exhaust each other. The worst that we can expect is that they’ll continue to be the dog in the manger and will also continue to supply the Iranians.
15. Is Russia more likely to emerge as a savior or spoiler in international diplomacy on Iran?
As long as Putin is in charge, Russia will be a spoiler in international diplomacy with respect to Iran. Russia’s current relationship enables the country to exert some level of influence over a traditional enemy.
16. Will U.S.-European coordination remain durable, and if so, will it be adequate to
contain Iran?
No. France and Germany will persuade themselves that just a little more negotiation will get a better outcome forever.
17. Is Iran likely to use its influence in Iraq to respond to international pressure on the nuclear issue?
I believe that Iran will exert whatever leverage it has on events on Iraq to its greatest capacity come what may. I think it’s already doing so.
18. Would a military strike against Iran make the country more or less likely to support terrorist groups around the world?
I think the “rally ’round†effect would secure the position of the mullahs and motivate the Iranians to do whatever they could against us.
19. Will the international community seek to impose sanctions on Iran?
Unfortunately, at this point I think the likelihood of the international community posing sanctions on Iran that are sufficiently serious and sufficiently non-porous to secure the desired outcome is very low. However, I’m sure they’d be happy to hold our coat for us.
20. Will Iran seek to make a “grand bargain†that the United States should actively
pursue?
No. I think that the present Iranian government has more to lose by negotiating with “the Great Satan†than they stand to gain. At least I hope so.
By all means read the examinations on each of these questions from CSIS. They’re fairly and dispassionately stated and prepared by people who know a lot more about what they’re talking about than I do. You’re bound to learn something if only what your own opinion is.
Well, that makes happy reading, eh? The only point I would quibble on is #11. I think anti-ship missiles could be used against big, fat, slow-moving tankers in the Gulf and do a hell of a lot of economic damage to the West.
I have a 21st Question: Had we stopped at Afghanistan and stayed out of Iraq, would we now be in a stronger possition vis a vis Iran?
My answer: We wouldn’t have 140,000 men at the wrong end of an umbilical cord that runs through Shiite Iraq. We’d have ground forces available for options like seizing Iranian coastal areas to protect shipping, or seize oil producing areas, or credibly threaten regime change. We might still have the international credibility to rally some support among Europeans. The Arabs — who want Iran stopped more than we do — might be more inclined to trust us on any action we took.
I think all that would improve the math. Not sure if it would be enough.
While all that is true, we also would be in some difficulties about our ability to intervene in Iran because we would have to simultaneously keep Saddam contained (the no-fly zones would be maintained, the bases in Saudi would have to be protected, Kuwait would have to be guarded, the Kurds protected, and so on) as well as fight Iran. There’s no free lunch here.
Why not Pakistan?
Regards, C
I’m not sure what your question is, Cernig, nor to whom it’s addressed.
I’ve been on the record for a long time opposing invading or bombing Iran. As to why a nuclear-armed Pakistan isn’t a threat there’s a host of reasons. India is more than able (and willing) to deal with an expansionist Pakistan. There’s no comparable balance to Iran in the Middle East. Pakistan has never shown the ability or inclination to disrupt commerce in the Gulf. The Pakistanis have never occupied our embassy or declared war on us. The Pakistani stores aren’t filled with merchandise devoted to the hatred of America and every demonstration isn’t an anti-American one. And so on.
Jeff:
That’s a really good point.
Dave,
What I mean by my question is that I simply don’t understand the American hard-on for Iran. I’ve been following developments on the sub-continent closely. perhaps because I’m a Brit and the sub-continent always seems closer to us because of our history there. By any objective measure Pakistan is far more of a threat than Iran, it’s just better at concealing that threat and pretending to be other than it is. Actions today speak louder than actions two decades ago.
Pakistan is THE nuclear and missile tech proliferator of note. Khan’s network is still up and running with government approval, according to international experts at Jane’s Defense.
Pakistan provides the personnel for more terror attacks on the West than any other nation, and those that don’t hail from there are almost always found to have gone there for training.
Pakistan’s ISI has been found (by NATO) to be funding the Taliban (and thus Al Qaeda) and (by India) the LeK and actively involved in terror attacks in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan has caught and released Islamist terror chiefs wanted internationally for their crimes within the last few months.
Just about every terrorist caught and handed over by Pakistan, on inspection, turns out to be a threat to Musharaff rather than the West. Those who threaten the West – like Osama and Mullah Omar and the 20,000 Taliban-trained militants estimated to be in Karachi alone – are given free rein. Jane’s says that support for terror groups is a deliberate assymetric strategy of Pakistan’s government, not the actions of rogue units.
India cannot contain Pakistani aggression, as is obvious from Afghanistan. In any case, the Pakistani military alliance with China entirely drives India’s foreign policy. Did you know both nations are holding massive joint exercises right now?
If you think Pakistan’s demonstrations don’t contain a massive Anti-American sentiment then you’ve not been paying attention.
Dave, America has been conned, big time, by a dictator who wants American weaponry and an America who won’t bomb his nation back to the stone age, as was once threatened. That doesn’t mean he has changed sides, just that he’s being careful to offer ‘plausible deniability”. As soon as you look hard, the plausibility vanishes – Musharaff is at the head of an Islamist nation and wants to stay there.
However, politicos on both sides of the aisle here in the U.S. don’t want to admit to having been conned so well – not to mention all that lucre for weapons – and so the game continues.
For at least six years policymakers from both camps have touted Pakistan as an ally in the ‘war on terror’. Hundreds of statements have been made to that effect and have been backed by votes and decisions giving Pakistan billions in taxpayer’s funds as well as some of the most sophisticated weaponry on the planet. To do an about-face now and admit that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism – a rogue state which has duped those policymakers into thinking it was an ally with some token assistance on basing, some captures of lesser terror figures who are instantly replaceable and clever rhetoric concealing active backing of terror groups – would be a political “loss-of-confidence” disaster of monumental proportions for both parties, both domestically and in the international arena. That’s why they continue to be duped – they just don’t want to face the fallout of any such admission. To me, that’s just saving up bad news with interest.
Regards, C