Today I find myself on the same side of an argument with the editorial writers of the New York Times editorial page:
For the last five years, Iran has been playing cat-and-mouse with nuclear inspectors. The I.A.E.A. turns up worrying hints of illicit activities, and Iran’s leaders insist they are trying to produce nuclear energy, not a bomb. Iranian officials then balk at answering critical questions, providing essential documents or access to related sites, leaving the world no choice but to suspect the worst. The I.A.E.A. often couches its findings in soothing diplomatese. But the latest report makes clear that its experts are deeply frustrated.
The report says that Iran continues to defy the United Nations Security Council by enriching uranium — usable for reactors, or with a little more work, a weapon — and is building ever-more-powerful centrifuges. It also expresses serious concerns about evidence (outlined in 18 documents accompanying the report) that Iran is working on programs with clear military applications: developing high-voltage detonators, underground testing and redesigning the Shahab-3 missile, possibly to accommodate a nuclear warhead.
And why, as the report asks, is Iran’s military involved in “procurement activities†for the program if it is intended only for nuclear power? Why indeed.
I honestly don’t see how one could reach any other conclusion although I’ve seen some folks whose hearts are, I think, in the right place tying themselves into pretzels trying to justify the Iranian regime’s actions.
The NYT continues:
The United States and the other major powers — Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany — have yet to put together a serious package of incentives and sanctions that might persuade Iran to change course.
That must include a credible American offer of security guarantees and normalized relations if Tehran abandons any nuclear weapons ambitions. If Iran persists, it must face sanctions with a lot more bite than Russia and China have been willing to consider, including a broader ban on doing business with Iranian banks and bans on arms sales and new investments in Iran.
That’s very nearly precisely the same course as I’ve been urging for nearly four years here. Just search on “Iran” in my archives. I wrote this back in 2006:
I believe that both carrots and sticks make for the most successful negotiations particularly on the international scene. But to be really effective the carrots must be tasty and the stick must be big enough to cause some pain.
continuing by noting how anti-stick the Europeans have become.
I really don’t know how to feel about seeing eye-to-eye with the NYT editorial writers. As Sam Clemens said about being tarred and feathered and run out of town on a rail, if it weren’t for the honor I’d just as soon have walked. But it’s good to have company.
Good post, but I think it’s important to distinguish between past activities and future intentions. Whatever Iran’s intentions are going forward (and I think those intentions are debatable), the IAEA is looking at Iranian activities in the past – specifically 2003 and before. Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that Iran decided in 2003 to give up its ambitions for a nuclear weapon. Given that Iraq and the threat of Saddam Hussein was the primary motivator for beginning their weapons program in the first place, that’s not an unreasonable argument to make, in my opinion. Assuming that is the case, Iran still has every incentive to keep the IAEA and international community from definitively discovering evidence of their past illegal activities. So I don’t think Iran’s obstinance and lack of transparency is necessarily good evidence of Iran’s future intent because they will want to keep their previous activities secret regardless of their intentions.
That’s a very good point, Andy. One thing that I think bears mentioning is that, while I think the notion that the U. S. is exaggerating Iran’s activities is possible, are Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China also overreacting? I’d even accept the argument that Britain is merely following our lead. But France, Germany, Russia, and China? Nah. Particularly Russia which probably has significantly better human intelligence on Iran than we do.