In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, two former U. S. Secretaries of State outline the problems with the deal with Iran:
For two decades, American presidents from both parties have affirmed that the U.S. is unalterably opposed to an Iranian military nuclear capability. They have usually added a warning to the effect that “all options are on the table” in pursuit of this policy. A clear trans-Atlantic consensus, a decade of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports and six United Nations Security Council resolutions have buttressed this position.
The interim nuclear deal with Iran has been described as the first step toward the elimination of Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon. That hope resides, if at all, in the prospects of the next round of negotiations envisaged to produce a final outcome within six months. Standing by itself, the interim agreement leaves Iran, hopefully only temporarily, in the position of a nuclear threshold power—a country that can achieve a military nuclear capability within months of its choosing to do so. A final agreement leaving this threshold capacity unimpaired would institutionalize the Iranian nuclear threat, with profound consequences for global nonproliferation policy and the stability of the Middle East.
The Obama Administration itself has characterized the deal that’s on the table as a “first step”, something the Iranians have vehemently denied. For them it’s a last step. Can anyone produce evidence that further negotiations will cause concessions to be forthcoming from the Iranian regime? I’ve already expressed my opinion: any agreement that doesn’t include complete and unrestricted access to international inspectors is nothing more than a joint press release.
On a lighter note “Kissinger and Shultz” sounds like a vaudeville act my grandfather was a part of. Maybe that was “O’Malley and Shultz”.
If Iran does not agree to more negotiations and more concessions then the sanctions go back in effect. We now know that they really hurt. I think we need to remember that they have their own hardliners, just like we have our neocons. I am sure someone in Iran is claiming this is just like Munich.
Serious question. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty guarantees that participants may use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Is it really possible to use nuclear power for peaceful reasons, power and medical, and not be a threshold country?
Steve
Sure. It’s just not possible for a country to have domestic enrichment capability and not be a threshold country.
The counter-argument to your observation (not one I’m endorsing, mind you, but it is the counter-argument) is that it will be much harder to re-impose sanctions once lifted than it was impose them to begin with. Very similar things were said 15 years ago about Iraq.
Another counter-argument that I’m not endorsing, merely pointing out is that having confidence that the sanctions “really hurt” makes it the perfect time to impose more sanctions. I.e. when your adversary is asking for a hudna, he’s actually negotiating for time to regroup for another attack. The smart thing to do is attack.
“Can anyone produce evidence that further negotiations will cause concessions to be forthcoming from the Iranian regime?”
Not a chance in hell. When you negotiate in earnest, you get it done now, period.
“…I’m not endorsing, merely pointing out is that having confidence that the sanctions “really hurt†makes it the perfect time to impose more sanctions. I.e. when your adversary is asking for a hudna, he’s actually negotiating for time to regroup for another attack.”
Perfect.
“The smart thing to do is attack.”
Or just hold the line. You don’t have to poke them in the eye to get what you want.
It seems obvious the Administration has come to a number of conclusions:
1) Iran is determined to develop the capabilityto quickly deploy a nuclear deterrent.
2) Sanctions, while weakening Iran’s economy and making life worse for the woman in the street, have not been particularly effective at preventing or slowing Iran’s nuclear program.
3) A military response cannot guarantee an end to the program, and in any case military action by a weakened American military with few to no allies in the effort is unacceptable.
Obama and his team are (for once) adjusting to the reality that the
U. S. no longer has the ability to unilaterally dictate outcomes and an accommodation with the Iranian leadership is the best possible outcome at this time.
And without the interim agree, Iran can theoretically achieve military nuclear capability within months. Iran has been enriching nonstop since 2007, this agreement puts a pause on that and rolls some of the enrichment progress back. The agreement gives inspectors access to areas, facilities and processes they previously didn’t have access to, particularly the Arak reactor and the factories building centrifuges. That will give us a lot of valuable information on Iran’s capabilities that will be necessary to determine the scale and scope of their progress and will be essential for negotiating a final deal. If Iran rejects or fails to implement any part of the interim deal, then the whole thing is off and the sanctions automatically are back on to where they were – and I have little doubt that Congress would authorize additional sanctions.
They key question in the future is preventing a nuclear military program. The various sides in this debate are operating under different assumptions:
On one side are those who think Iran must be denied the capability to produce the nuclear material. Personally, I think that ship sailed long ago. Iran already has the knowledge and engineering expertise. Centrifuges are easily hidden – even if Iran agrees to dismantle its existing infrastructure (something they certainly would not agree to), they could setup secret facilities. For this option to actually work, Iran would have to completely capitulate – they’d have to not only agree to dismantlement but also to an inspections and transparency regime to ensure the absence of secret facilities. I don’t think this is realistically achievable.
On the other side are those (including myself) who think that transparency is best long-term solution – with a robust inspections regime Iran could not build a nuclear weapon without being detected. The goal here is not to prevent Iran from the capability, but to provide warning should Iran choose to go down that path and, potentially, place some technical restrictions on Iran. This is how most arms-control agreements work in practice. Trust is not a requirement, it all comes down to verification. For a highly technical area such as this, the details are very important.
Iran has never complied with its obligations under the NPT, it has repeatedly and persistently been found by the IAEA to be non-compliant and uncooperative. That’s why I think that the minimum requirement for any agreement is what you’ve asked for—transparency. The Iranians have never offered that, aren’t offering it now, and, frankly, I’m skeptical that they’ll ever offer it.
Returning to the Rumsfeld triplet, our problems are with the known unknowns and the unknown unknowns. The very most the agreement will do even if fully implemented (far from a done deal) has to do with the known unknowns only.