And if so what is it?
The Iranians have rejected and denounced the summary of the agreement between the P5+1 nations and the Iranians on Iran’s nuclear development program:
TEHRAN (FNA)- The Iranian Foreign Ministry on Tuesday called invalid a press release by the White House alleged to be the text of the nuclear agreement struck by Iran and the Group 5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain and France plus Germany) in Geneva on Sunday.
“What has been released by the website of the White House as a fact sheet is a one-sided interpretation of the agreed text in Geneva and some of the explanations and words in the sheet contradict the text of the Joint Plan of Action (the title of the Iran-powers deal), and this fact sheet has unfortunately been translated and released in the name of the Geneva agreement by certain media, which is not true,†Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham said on Tuesday.
She said that the four-page text under the name of the Joint Plan of Action (which has been released by the Iranian foreign ministry) was the result of the agreement reached during the Geneva talks and all of its sentences and words were chosen based on the considerations of all parties to the talks. In fact one of the reasons why negotiations between Iran and the G5+1 took so long pertained to the accuracy which was needed for choosing the words for the text of the agreement, Afkham said, explaining that the Iranian delegation was much rigid and laid much emphasis on the need for this accuracy.
Included in the linked article is what is characterized as the full text of the draft agreement.
The draft agreement includes an implicit acknowledgement of concession on the part of the P5+1 of one of Iran’s primary negotiating points: its “right to enrich”, rejected as recently as the weekend (after the agreement) by Secretary of State John Kerry. That would suggest that there is some disagreement about what has actually been agreed upon.
It’s also unclear to me why White House officials are characterizing the agreement as a “first step” which would imply that future concessions by Iran are a possibility. Quite to the contrary it might be that the P5+1 are so desperate for a deal with Iran that they’ve made all the concessions while Iran has conceded nothing. It seems to me that the minimum requirement for a workable agreement would be unrestricted inspection rather than the “enhanced inspection” called for in the draft agreement.
So once again Kerry is made to look the stooge. If he were a college football coach, he’d be getting the dreaded ‘vote of confidence’ from his superiors right about now.
It appears the Administration’s credibility on this issue is about the same as it was on the PPACA. “If you like your nuclear inspection scheme, you can keep it.”
…so where does that leave the United States? If Iran denouces the ‘fact’ summary, does that invalidate the agreement? Or, are we stuck with giving our part of the sanction relief, while the Iranians call foul, and do what they want?
Article II, Section 2 of the U. S. Constitution:
The emphasis is mine. In other words, there is no treaty until it’s ratified by the Senate. The recent “nuclear option” would have no effect on the treaty ratification. I would think that, since the agreement contradicts so many UNSC resolutions, there would need to be some sort of Security Council action, too, but that would be largely pro forma since the permanent Security Council members are all parties to the agreement.
I’m not sure at this point what they’d be ratifying.
Its not a legally-binding agreement, more of a letter of intent or outline of trust-building steps to take. Duncan Hollis concludes “[T]his isn’t binding under international law. It’s a political commitment, not a legal one.” If that’s true, you cannot really argue the meaning of a word, since none of the words were intended to have independent significance to be used against each other. Also, if it doesn’t have legal effect, it does not need to be ratified by the Senate.
I think that’s even more problematic than my previous remarks would suggest, PD. First, a treaty is anything the Senate says is a treaty. Second, complying with the whatever-it-is cannot be done by the president’s by-your-leave alone. It will require Congressional action and doing an end-run around the Senate is usually not the best way to get the Senate’s cooperation on something and, well, you know how the House is these days.
Additionally, the Iranians seem to think that the words actually mean something and it’s actually a treaty. Silly Iranians.
I think the situation is probably mutual distrust of an inspection regime. The Iranians fear that inspections will interfere with domestic prerogatives or be a tool of espionage or war aims. The U.S. doesn’t trust the Iranians to fully cooperate. I would have questioned whether the Iranians would publicly acknowledge reaching a deal with the U.S. given their revolutionary rhetoric. So the situation appears to be that we are embarking on an informal, undefined inspection regime that nobody has to comply with and in six months we might have developed a course of dealing and trust which could serve as an actual agreement.
I think there is something positional going on about this “right of enrichment.” I think the Iranians believe that its implicit in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that a country has a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. I think the U.S. position (and implicit in the Security Council Resolutions) is the right exists only as a result of the treaty framework and contingent upon strict adherence to an international framework. Since the U.S. position is that Iran is outside the framework, and needs to be brought into the framework, I am not sure the positions matter or need to be decided. IOW, if Iran is agreeing to enrich uranium peacefully within an international framework, it really doesn’t matter how we get to that point.
It isn’t just the U. S. position. The IAEA has repeatedly cited Iran for being out of compliance. They have never come into compliance.
Additionally and importantly in the context of an eventual agreement, the Iranians have a history of deliberately concealing the scope of their activities and lying about them to international inspectors.
That’s actually the source of my skepticism about reaching any agreement. Why wouldn’t they conceal what they’re doing again this time?
I think you need to remember that Iran has its own hardliners, its own religious fundamentalists, and they have significant influence. (We have the same problem in the US and it is even worse in Israel, so this is not unique.) I suspect some of this is posturing for domestic consumption. I think PD gets the rest of it, i.e. the Iranians are assuming that they will be able to enrich as needed for peaceful purposes. By my readings, there oil reserves are not that great and I dont know if fracking is an option for them. With little access to foreign currency w/o their own oil, they will need energy from some source. Nuclear is one of their answers.
Steve
I don’t trust the Iranian government, and I suspect they think they can reach a “peaceful” point just short of full-weaponized capabilities. That might be enough to serve Iranian interests in deterring other powers from interfering with its revolutionary adventurism. Though it would not satisfy its interests in identifying itself domestically and abroad as a member of the nuclear club, a great world power. Perhaps it could maintain near-weaponized capabilities, while promoting a whisper campaign against itself.