I have so many problems with William Lind’s article, “How to Win in Iraq”, that I scarcely know where to start in criticizing it. However, I do like his method: first, identify what our strategic interests are in Iraq and, second, identify the steps towards securing them, even in the face of tactical loss or stalemate. Since the position I’m inching towards is that we need to figure out how, both tactically and politically, to deal with a permanent stalemate in Iraq, much as we did in Korea, I find his general approach worth considering.
However, his article is riddled with so many errors and false assumptions that I’ll only mention a few. First, I sincerely doubt that Moqtada al-Sadr has any capability other than to make trouble in Iraq. The idea that he can re-establish a unitary state in Iraq is absurd. Second, I think there’s an imputation in Lind’s article that there’s more homogeneity in Shi’a thought than actually exists. Moqtada al-Sadr probably represents the most Khomeinist thought among Shi’a in Iraq and I think that a Khomeinist government in Iraq is not tolerable. Not all Shi’ites are Khomeinist.
I don’t think there’s any chance whatever that the Sunni Arabs of Iraq or Iraq’s Kurds would stand idly by with an openly Khomeinist Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad. What would be their incentives to do so?
Finally, I think that Mr. Lind too quickly discounts the willingness of Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors to intervene, one way or another, in the Iraq that he envisions.
I don’t think there’s any chance whatever that the Sunni Arabs of Iraq or Iraq’s Kurds would stand idly by with an openly Khomeinist Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad. What would be their incentives to do so?
The Kurds are out of the control of the Iraqi government, whatever Shia faction happens to end up in charge, whether it is the Mahdi Army of the Badr Brigades. I think either faction would move quickly to smash Al Qaeda in Iraq. The foreigners in Iraq would find very different rules of engagement exist as soon as the Americans leave.
The Sunnis would have the same incentives the Shia had under Saddam,. That would be to not get tortured and put to death.
My point was that Lind’s objective is a unitary state of Iraq. I don’t see his preferred approach (giving the reins to the Khomeinists) having that result.
Frankly, I doubt it. I think their attention would be focused on consolidating their holdings in the south of Iraq and Baghdad. I think they’d leave the Sunni western provinces to their own devices.
Dave,
I agree. Left to its own devices, the people of the “state” of “Iraq” will partition themselves into three or perhaps 4 “statelets” along historic lines. Baghdad will likely be Shi’ite dominated after an ethnic cleansing campaign, but as you said, the Shiites are divided themselves and are currently battling each other in the south. No group has the power to “reunite” Iraq through force. One might get that power with outside assistance, but of course such assistance would be countered by other assistance to opposing groups.
The more time that passes and the more I read and understand the current conflict and the history of Iraq, the more I’m pushed into the partition camp and the notion that a united “Iraq” is a fantasy.
BTW, I think William Lind is a tool.
I am predisposed to treat all suggestions seriously and on their merit, regardless of their source.
Andy, I would be interested in the historical lines you think might be redrawn. Its my rough understanding that the Ottoman lines don’t necessarily reflect current religous/ethnic divisions either.
My understanding is that there are more Shi’ites in Baghdad than there used to be, a direct consequence of Saddam’s depredations on the south, and there are more Sunni Arabs in the north than there used to be.
Dave,
You’re correct. What is now called “Sadr City” used to be called “Saddam City” and was basically a section built to contain rebellious Shiites. The Green Zone is actually one of many forts surrounding it designed to protect the regime and contain marauding Shiites. Additionally, Saddam move many Sunni tribes up into Kurdish areas in his never-ending attempts to pacify that area.
Drawing lines would obviously be difficult and frankly I don’t know enough to make such a judgment.