Email from a Colonel

I found the email from a “Colonel in Baghdad” posted by Glenn Reynolds very interesting, particularly this section:

I don’t know how long before the GoI will transform into a model government able to care for its citizenry. However, if the Coalition left suddenly at this point in time, the many tribal and sectarian militias, like JAM, would seize control from the GoI. Soldiers would return home to fight for their homes and families. The country would slip into civil war along sectarian lines over distribution of oil revenues. The Sunnis would seek partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the Shia with Iran, and you can see where that would be heading. These recent insurgent attacks cannot be allowed to undermine the incredible value added by the surge. Likewise, the vital importance of remaining here until the Government of Iraq is viable cannot be overstated.

IMO this is a credible interpretation of human behavior and, indeed, the primary reason I don’t advocate a complete and immediate withdrawal of our forces from Iraq.

Contrariwise, I don’t find the view that the sole reason that Iraqis are killing other Iraqis is to get rid of the Americans a credible interpretation of human behavior.

If we withdraw our forces from Iraq, it won’t end the war. It won’t end the killing. Iraqis aren’t killing other Iraqis solely because American soldiers are there. The various factions in Iraq are contending for power, influence, resources, prestige and Lord knows what else. They’re willing to kill other Iraqis to achieve those objectives. They’ll still be willing to kill other Iraqis to achieve those objectives when we leave.

Obviously, it isn’t in the interests of the Iraqis who’ll be killed for the war in Iraq to go on in our absence. And it isn’t in our interests, either.

For me the questions are:

  1. How can maintaining a force large enough to provide some level of security in Iraq be maintained logistically?
  2. How can maintaining a force large enough to provide some level of security in Iraq be maintained fiscally?
  3. How can maintaining a force large enough to provide some level of security in Iraq be maintained politically?
  4. What can we do to encourage incremental political progress while this is going on?
4 comments… add one
  • We’re about to have an election. If the Democrats win, then we will have a hard time doing 1-3 because the people will have spoken. Obama or Clinton will walk it back from precipitate to cautious withdrawal, but I doubt it can be walked back to Bush 3.0.

    If McCain wins he’ll have a honeymoon period on Iraq. If casualties are low, Iraq seems to be progressing, and the economy recovers, he’ll keep a fairly free hand beyond the honeymoon.

    But more and more, I suspect that what we can do to accomplish #4 is to begin leaving. Civil war threatens because there are serious issues between the various factions. An optimist might be tempted to believe we can simply submerge those tensions beneath the smothering blanket of continued American presence. A pessimist might be tempted to offer a one word riposte: Yugoslavia. How many hundreds of billions of dollars, and how many lives, shall we spend in order to delay rather than stop a civil war?

    They may need to have their fight. Or they may resolve matters peacefully, once they see that we’re leaving. But one of the few things that seems clear from recent events in Basra, is that Maliki’s government is just another faction. One faction employing US and British power to dominate rival factions is not much of a path to democracy or stability in Iraq. We’re being made into a pawn (okay, rook) in someone else’s chess game. We’re stalling, not solving.

  • Like every president, the incoming Democratic president will take his (or her) election as a mandate. Since neither Obama nor Clinton are running on withdrawing from Iraq, merely withdrawing “combat brigades”, a subset of the total, there’s plenty of wiggle room for them to do pretty much anything he (or she) might care to.

    I think that if we begin leaving exactly the opposite of what you’re conjecturing—the wheels will really come off as the competing factions prepare for life without the Americans.

    For me there are a host of differences between this situation and that of Yugoslavia, the most important being scale and interest. Location, location, location.

  • Ken Hoop Link

    Well, really, Dave, you must know there were Colonels in Vietnam assuring of ultimate victory even late in the war. I suggest you review General William E. Odom’s consistent
    negative prognosis and counsel to leave throughout the war. Since he is yet military,you can use his wisdom as training wheel increments on the road to biking down a non-imperialist political trail.

  • Ken Hoop Link

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