The intensity of the crisis in Gaza, which began with the seizing of an Israeli soldier by Palestinians six days ago, has ratcheted up yet another notch:
GAZA CITY, Gaza Strip – Israeli aircraft sent missiles tearing through the office of Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh on Sunday in an unmistakable message to his ruling Hamas group to free an Israeli soldier.
Defense Minister Amir Peretz told a Cabinet meeting that Israel would go after “higher-caliber targets” in the future — a reference to senior Hamas officials inside and outside the Palestinian territories, a high-ranking political official said.
Israeli aircraft, tanks and naval gunboats have been pounding Gaza for the past week in an effort to win the freedom of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, who was seized in a cross-border raid that left two comrades dead. Thousands of troops also were sent into the coastal strip for Israel’s first ground invasion since quitting Gaza nine months ago.
Late last week, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called off plans to broaden the incursion in deference to intense diplomatic efforts involving Egypt and other regional players. Signaling that patience with diplomacy had worn thin, Olmert told his Cabinet on Sunday that his government had instructed the military to “do all it can” to return the 19-year-old soldier safely.
There has been no direct evidence of the soldier’s condition since he was seized by Hamas-linked militant groups.
I’ve found a lot of the discussion and analysis on this story hyperbolic.
For example, Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas characterized the Israeli’s actions as “collective punishmentâ€. That’s nonsense. First, the Israeli’s actions have been extremely measured and targeted and there’s been an extraordinarily small loss of life so far. And second, after putting their affairs into the hands of a terrorist organization what did the Palestinians expect? At the very least by this choice they’ve consented to whatever measures Israel must take to prevent its people from being attacked and its soldiers from being kidnapped.
Characterizing the Palestinians as a burgeoning democracy that deserves our support seems excessive to me, too. Civil rights, the rule of law, and a monopoly on the use of force in the hands of the state are prerequisites for democracy, not lagniappes. When the electorate has its choice among armed political parties, that’s not democracy.
Unless things change the only outcomes I can imagine are either the abolition of the state of Israel or the expulsion of the Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank. Both sides appear to have hardened into the extreme positions.
I’d honestly like to see some sort of negotiated settlement but I can’t see what the basis for such a settlement would be. A minimum requirement would appear to be the willingness on the part of the Palestinians to root out the terrorists who are firing rockets into Israel on a daily basis. I seem to recall Abbas rejecting such a course of action on the grounds that it would create a civil war in Palestine. How you’d tell the difference I have no idea.
Even if you accept that Israel was right to invade Gaza in response, destroying the only power plant there, which also deprives people of clean water, is the definition of collective punishment.
No. That’s a misuse of the term “collective punishment”. If the Israelis were firing indiscriminately or attacking targets without tactical significance, you’d have a point. But the power plant clearly does have tactical significance. Attacking such a target even if the attack affects the population at large does not constitute collective punishment.
And, as I noted, by their actions the Palestinians have consented to Israeli efforts to secure their kidnapped soldier.
Look, I have no particular love for the Israelis. I am not nearly as pro-Israel as many Americans are. I don’t think the current relationship between the U. S. and Israel is particularly in our best interest. But I also can’t blame them much for what they’re doing. It’s an extremely sad situation..
Michael Walzer, in “Arguing About War”:
Selected infrastructural targets are easy enough to justify: bridges over which supplies are carried to the army in the field provide an obvious example. But power and water – water most clearly – are very much like food: they are necessary to the survival and everyday activity of soldiers, but they are equally necessary to everyone else. An attack here is an attack on civilian society. In this case, it is the military effects, if any, that are “collateral.” The direct effect of the destruction of water purification plants, for example, was to impose upon civilians in urban areas (and Iraq is a highly urbanized society) the risk of disease in epidemic proportions. (Walzer 96)
While Walzer here is talking about the first Gulf War, his argument seems to apply almost exactly to the situation in Gaza. The Israelis were justified in destroying the bridges, but not the power plants. Walzer goes on to make the point (also in “Just and Unjust Wars”) that what has to be analyzed is not merely the “tactical significance” of a target, but also the proportionality of its effect on civilians. If the Israelis could flip a switch and immediately and simultaneously kill everyone in Gaza, that would have “tactical significance”, but it would still be immoral for its disproportionate effect on civilians.
Btw, I’m a (recently) contracted Army ROTC cadet.
I agree but that’s not what we’re talking about here and, as I noted in my original post, it’s hyperbolic. Once again, the Israelis have inflicted almost no casualties of any kind in this operation so far. You’re claiming that potential for casualties is in no way different from actual casualties and that’s a stretch. The situations in Iraq during the Gulf War and Gaza are not in any way comparable and one of the differences is the issue of consent (which you haven’t addressed).
Presumably you accept that the destruction of the power plant will have a disproportionate effect on civilians compared to the militants responsible, if only in terms of the numbers affected.
If you believe this is acceptable because the consequences to the civilian population of Gaza are not very severe, then I would note that not only is the total loss of power resulting in considerable suffering already, but that, while no casualties may have been inflicted “so farâ€, the deaths that the loss of power will cause (and estimates for replacing the plant put six months as a minimum) will occur in the future from, for example, lack of clean water. I agree that potential for casualties is different from actual casualties, and I hope I’m wrong about Gaza, but given the already difficult conditions there, destroying the only power plant seems certain to produce civilian casualties. In addition, I fail to see how it would even offer a serious military advantage (it’s not like it shut down their air defense network or something).
When you say that the Palestinians gave “consent†to “whatever measures Israel must take†when they elected Hamas, I would point out that even if they knew that Israel would declare war on Palestine, as I acknowledge the capture of Cpl Shalit gives Israel casus belli, that does not free Israel from practicing jus in bello (i.e. obeying the laws of war), of which the destruction of the power plant is, I would argue, a violation, along with other techniques they have used in the past (e.g. human shields).
FWIW, the effects of the powerplant destruction, along with Israel’s other measures of collective punishment, are becoming apparent. http://www.juancole.com/2006/07/food-water-running-out-for-gazas.html