| Tne New York Times, Dec. 2009 | The New York Times, May 2017 |
| Americans have reason to be pessimistic, if not despairing, about the war in Afghanistan. After eight years of fighting, more than 800 American lives lost and more than 200 billion taxpayer dollars spent, the Afghan government is barely legitimate and barely hanging on in the face of an increasingly powerful Taliban insurgency.
In his speech Tuesday night, President Obama showed considerable political courage by addressing that pessimism and despair head-on. He explained why the United States cannot walk away from the war and outlined an ambitious and high-risk strategy for driving back the Taliban and bolstering the Afghan government so American troops can eventually go home. For far too long — mostly, but not only, under President George W. Bush — Afghanistan policy has had little direction and no accountability. Mr. Obama started to address those problems at West Point, although the country needs to hear more about how he intends to pay for the war and how he will decide when Afghanistan will be able to stand on its own. |
It’s hard not to feel a disquieting, even disheartening, sense of déjà vu as the Pentagon presses its request to increase the American forces in Afghanistan. That is where the United States has spent 16 years fighting the longest war in its history at a cost of more than $800 billion and 2,000 American lives. Where there is still no peace, and where everything seems to be going backward. Where the Taliban has regained the initiative, attacking as it pleases and expanding its territorial reach, and where other extremists — Al Qaeda and the Islamic State — also have a foothold.
There are now about 8,400 American troops in Afghanistan. Military commanders have asked for reinforcements of up to 5,000 more. Just a modest increase, they argue, a “mini†surge of troops. But 5,000 troops would boost the American commitment by roughly 60 percent, a sizable reinvestment in a conflict that President Barack Obama had promised was drawing to a close. It is not unusual for American military commanders to ask for more troops and weapons in pursuit of victory. But can they make a decisive difference? How can 3,000 or even 5,000 more American troops ensure victory when the United States at one point had a force of nearly 100,000 in Afghanistan and was unable to defeat the Taliban and stabilize the country? And what would victory look like anyway? |
What has changed their minds? The prospects for victory in Afghanistan are no greater than they were eight years ago. Is the the additional 1,200 American lives lost? Is it the additional $600 billion spent? Is it that they’ve learned by experience?
Well, even a stopped clock is right twice a day. The NYT opinion is right – increased force won’t achieve the stated goals of the military. Lets be generous, they changed their minds because they are shrewd, they are catering to what their readers want to read.
If they only hold the line against a Jihadist Afghan caliphate, 10,000 to 50,000 professional, volunteer, American warriors for ever and ever does not seem to be excessive for a nation of 330 million who claim to hold freedom dear to their hearts.
And I did cancel my scrip to the NYT’S because of the incessant Trump bashing. You can talk about his boastfulness, or his crudeness, or his hair, O.K. but all the crap about back channel communications with Russians? They all do this, it’s how things work. The NYT’S has chosen a political party to support and it ain’t mine.
Someone did finally ask the right question: what is victory in the context of Afghanistan?
To that I’d add: if we don’t know and never did, why are we there? And does no alternative exist to the same policy which shows no signs of succeeding?
For the last 16 years politicians have been minimizing personal downside risk.
“Why did they change their minds?”
Oh, cmon.
I was pretty active in the milblogs 8 years ago. We had just had what was perceived as a successful “surge”. A lot of people thought we could duplicate that in Afghanistan. As I recall that was a belief help by many across the political spectrum, i.e. it was not a Dem or GOP belief. Now, 8 years later, I think we can see that Iraq was not a real victory. We can see that we just aren’t going to have anything like what we would like as a good outcome in Afghanistan either.
” 10,000 to 50,000 professional, volunteer, American warriors”–So we spend $10 billion -$50 billion in perpetuity, losing many more US lives, and for that we will gain nothing. They can train jihadis in Pakistan or Somalia or Sudan or any number of other places.
Steve
Before we go through for the umpteenth time the merits of the surge, or the merits of withdrawal – could I add my rather cynical observation.
Why are we still arguing? Both sides got what they wanted. Those who wanted a withdrawal from Iraq got their withdrawal. Those who wanted troops there, well the US has thousands of troops there now, and there are NO plans for them to leave from what I can see.
I’m going to run now before someone throws something at me.
CO- Bringing up the surge in this context is only important because many people, probably most, thought it had been successful. Trying to replicate it in Afghanistan, and our military said we could, was not unreasonable at the time if you believed that.
Steve
It is to be expected that the rooster will come to believe that his crowing does, indeed, cause the sun to rise.
Part of it is certainly what Steve discussed about the surge and I was very active in a number of forums trying to pour cold water on the idea of an Afghanistan surge from the beginning. Remember John Nagl? We don’t hear much about him anymore….
However, another part was the perception by many that GWB pursued a “war for oil” in Iraq which neglected the war in Afghanistan and prevented us from winning there. The argument goes that military forces and various other resources were diverted to Iraq and if that had not been done we would have won in Afghanistan and destroyed both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It was also used as the explanation for why the US didn’t get UBL. Pres. Obama specifically campaigned on that idea and his intention was clearly focused on “winning” in Afghanistan by reversing the perceived neglect for that conflict. See this speech from the 2008 campaign if you need a reminder:
Well, we know how that turned out (as many of us predicted at the time).
I can’t read into the minds of the NYT editorial staff, but I’d guess that their change is primarily due to two factors:
– The continuous failure of Afghan policy under both Republican and Democratic administrations. (and, related, the lack of any clear alternative policy coming from national security elites.)
– Skepticism / disdain for Pres. Trump and his policies.
Don’t hear much from David Kilcullen either. I actually bought his book too. Totally agree with your additional point Andy. I kind of just roll that into the surge argument, but they are separate.
Steve
Yeah, I haven’t thought about Kilcullin in years.
I think I’ve mentioned this before but on the mantle of a dear friend of ours is a picture of David Kilcullen—age 2. He’s her godson. She was in grad school with his parents.