In his column this morning David Brooks echoes some of the points I’ve been making here over the last few days, e. g. that Republicans would be likely to get most of the blame if things go pear-shaped:
House Republicans led the way and will get most of the blame. It has been interesting to watch them on their single-minded mission to destroy the Republican Party. Not long ago, they led an anti-immigration crusade that drove away Hispanic support. Then, too, they listened to the loudest and angriest voices in their party, oblivious to the complicated anxieties that lurk in most American minds.
I believe that what he characterizes as destroying the Republican Party is, in fact, the triumph of ideology over pragmatism and the consequence of the attempts to transform our catch-all parties into programmatic ones that are going on in both parties. Ideologues can’t agree; they are peculiarly unsuited to democratic republican government in which compromise is mandatory.
That’s what James Madison warned against in Federalist #10:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
He continues:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
[…]
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, — is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
Unfortunately, Madison did not count on the rise of political parties, modern methods of communication which provide opportunities for faction that cross state lines, nor he did count on the abandonment of government by enumerated powers which has reached its full fruition over the last 60 years.
Continuing with the Brooks column, he proceeds by characterizing the challenges posed by modern conditions:
We’re living in an age when a vast excess of capital sloshes around the world fueling cycles of bubble and bust. When the capital floods into a sector or economy, it washes away sober business practices, and habits of discipline and self-denial. Then the money managers panic and it sloshes out, punishing the just and unjust alike.
What we need in this situation is authority. Not heavy-handed government regulation, but the steady and powerful hand of some public institutions that can guard against the corrupting influences of sloppy money and then prevent destructive contagions when the credit dries up.
I don’t believe that he’s thought the implications of the worldwide flow of capital out sufficiently. The institutions he’s thinking about cannot be national regulatory institutions of the sort that we’ve had for the last 70 years but institutions more along the lines of the Navy which, along with the British Navy, has controlled the flow of worldwide trade through the oceans for the last century and a half.
Uh, what if they simply thought it was a crappy bill? Maybe they didn’t want to be stampeded into doing “something!” at the expense of doing “the right thing.”
That is what Brooks’ statements so silly. Sure, average people feel anxious about the economy, but that doesn’t mean they want Congress to do something stupid just so they can say they did “something.”
And hell, if the Democrats actually believed this was the right thing to do they might have tried fighting for it. Obviously, they didn’t…so what does that say about the legislation?
Besides, does Brooks really think that the calls, letter and emails that were flooding into elected officals offices (running 100-1 or more AGAINST this bailout) were really just the ideological wing of the Republican party? Thats just stupid.
As for Madison, he didn’t have ideologies in mind because ideologies, as we think of them, were not an intellectual category back then. The idea of “faction” is much more closely related to ruling political coalitions, in the Roman Republican sense. Indeed, Madison was a better (small ‘d’) democrat than you give him credit for. I really don’t think he would have had a problem if members of the House listened more closely to their constiuents than other branches of government. Hell, if we are going to base this on the Federalist Papers, shouldnt we expect the Senate to go forward in a more august and thoughtful manner? (The answer is “yes” they are supposed to do just that.) But did they? NO! They refuse to even begin the process by voting up or down on this measure. And why is that? Basically they are cowards who don’t want to get exposed during an election year.
It is the ruling elite, as a whole, of this country that is failing us so badly and not this or that party or ideological wing. Brooks will never recognize that because he is so emeshed within the elites’ pattern of thinking. For him the elites ARE the country, so what they say should go, and the rest of the American people should feel themselves lucky that the elite lower themselves to do our thinking for us.
If you conclude, as I do, that an imperfect plan was better than no plan at all and that a better plan was unlikely to be produced in this session, and finally that a plan introduced in the next session would be likely to be presented to fewer Republicans than are in the House today, then voting against the bill was a miscalculation on the part of the House Republicans.
Rich, do you advocate direct democracy?
The House is supposed to be more democratic, to more closely follow the opinions of “the people.” Thats not direct democracy…thats the House neing the the House.
And the question isn’t one of looking for “perfection.” Is there any reason to believe someone could look at this bill and deem it to be “harmful”? Given the fact is was thrown out there with little or no deliberation, I think we have to allow a “yes” to that question. So, if it legitimate for someone to conclude this bill could be “harmful” why would it be illegitimate to oppose it? It isn’t as if alternative schemes have not been suggested.
That was supposed to read:
The House is supposed to be more democratic, to more closely follow the opinions of “the people.†Thats not direct democracy…thats the House being the House.
Damn my quick but inaccurate fingers!
Is it not possible that the reasons the House failed to pass the bill is in fact due to what the Faction party has over the years created, a situation where hanging on to ones seat can out way the risk of loosing that seat when the vote is so evenly split?
Have you listened to talk radio, in recent days…the one sided poisonous talk has been turned up so loud, who can figure out what the real problems are through all that noise…it’s all just frantic faction banter in overdrive! This is a battle of ideology and a way of life that is coming to and end, and they know it. Perhaps this is a good thing, and even a bit serendipitous that the failure of those in the financial markets and those who have been preaching the mantra of unregulated free markets..has also come to light, the man behind the curtain is being exposed..
The Bill could be better, not perfect, but better, but political faction has created such a poisonous climate, where it may have not been in the best interest of the overall community to pass it, yet,
especially when there is a major election coming in just a few weeks?
Perhaps the financial problem is not just a U.S. problem, if money flows from country to country, why is this not a world market problem and if it is a world market problem, shouldn’t we be talking to other national governments as well…why have meetings behind closed doors, something is not clear…and we do not have all the facts about this bailout business…there’s more to this picture to come out..